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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the dissertation of Abrahim Jawad Al-Khalisi for the Doctor of 
Philosophy in Urban Studies presented November 5, 1993. 
Title: Comparative Analysis of Resettlement Policies in Third World 
Countries 
Settlement policy in the Third World has been stimulated by the 
availability of public land. This availability of public land has prompted 
many Third World countries to adopt policies or schemes called resettlement, 
transmigration, or land development. These have been presented as 
potential means for addressing numerous agendas held by Third World 
countries. Settlement policies have been used to increase agricultural 
production and make idle land productive. Spatial imbalances of population 
distribution have been addressed via settlement policies. For national 
security, settlement policies have been used to exploit frontier lands. 
Solutions to serious political problems including lack of agricultural self-
sufficiency, poverty, landlessness, and unemployment have been sought 
through settlement policies. 
Huge amounts of financial resources have been invested in Third World 
planned settlements, however, their performance has not been very 
encouraging. If not completely abandoned by settlers, the settlements gave 
officials, planners, and policy makers cause for serious concern. For the most 
part, settlements have been costly relative to the number of settlers. In manf 
instances, agricultural productivity was low. 
I have presented comparative case studies of land settlement policies 
which examine the factors that accounted for the success or failure of 
resettlement projects. I examined the resettlement projects from the point of 
view of the settlers in relation to the objectives of the policy makers. 
This study reports the findings of case studies concerning Iraq, Somalia, 
Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Israel. A comparative analysis of land settlement policies in 
Third World nations with varying political, social, and economic conditions 
is presented. 
It will be shown that land settlement policies in Third World countries, 
by and large, failed to reach objectives and are not now viewed as viable 
options for land development. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESEITLEMENT POLICIES 
IN TiflRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
by 
ABRAHIM JAWAD AL-KHALISI 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PillLOSOPHY 
in 
URBAN STUDIES 
Portland State University 
1993 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
LIST OF FIGURES vi 
CHAPTER 
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Questions Addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
II IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
The Context of Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Politics and Implementation in Third World Countries 10 
Ill INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
IV DUJAILA LAND SETTLEMENT IN IRAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Project Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
The Dujaila Land 
Water Policy of the Project 
The Administration and Facilities 
Dujaila Project Population and Social Life 
Dujaila's Homestead 
Soils 
Crop Rotation Practice 
Livestock in Dujaila 
Settler Adjustment 
The Success and Failure of the Dujaila Project. . . . . . . . . 39 
iii 
V LAND SETTLEMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA. 40 
The Colonial Settlement Era................ . . . . . . . . . 41 
Post-Colonial Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Spontaneous Settlements ............................ 42 
Objectives of Ujamaa 
Implementation of Ujamaa 
Structure of Ujamma Villages 
Formation of Ujamma Villages and 
Population Redistribution 
Population Redistribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Agricultural Production in the Settlements. . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Rural Income Distribution.......................... 49 
Villagization and Basic Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
Cost and Benefits of Land Settlements.............. . . 50 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
VI LAND SETTLEMENT IN ETHIOPIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
Objectives of Planned Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
The Settlement Process 
The Settlement Model 
The Settlements Scheme Achievement... . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
Conclusion........................................ 62 
VII RESETTLEMENT OF NOMADS IN SOMALIA . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
The Resettlement Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
The Nomad Resettlement 
Organization of the Settlements 
Settler Characteristics and Training 
Income and Work Incentives in the Settlements 
Assessment of Social Structure and Infrastructure . . . . . 68 
Population Redistribution 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
lV 
VIII LAND SETILEMENT IN MALAYSIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
Transfer of Land Ownership and Development ........ 73 
Group Settlement Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 
Fringe Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
Implementation and Settler Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
Development of Land 
Pattern of Settlement Development 
Land Development Achievements................... 79 
Conclusion........................................ 80 
IX LAND SETTLEMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
Settlement Policy History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
Conclusions and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
X SETILEMENTS IN ISRAEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
OTZEM Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
Type of Farming on the Settlement 
Land Allocation 
The Settlers' Income 
Participation in Production 
Demography 
Noam Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
Size of the Settlement 
N oam Settlers 
Type of Settlement Production 
From Administered to Self-Managed Communities: 
The Model in the Lakhish Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
Selection of Settlers 
The External Supporting Team 
Stages in the Transition from Administered to 
Self-Managed Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Stage of Administration of External Agencies 
Stage of Transition 
Stage of Consolidation and Weaning 
v 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 
XI LAND SETTLEMENTS IN INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
History of Transmigration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
Renewed Interest in Transmigration.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
Selection of Transmigrants 




Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 
XII COMPARISON OF SETTLEMENT PROJECTS............. 111 
Achievement of Settlement Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
Population Redistribution 
Settlements and Development of New Areas 
Land for the Landless 
Regional Development 
Agricultural Development 
Improved Welfare of the Settlers 
Settler Incomes 
Social Services 
Problems Confronting Settlement Programs.......... 117 
Abandonment of Settlement Projects 
Lack of Nonagricultural Employment and 
Second Generation Problems 
Social Tensions Between Settlers and Original 
Populations 
Ecological Problems 
XIII SETTLEMENT SUCCESS OR FAILURE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
Planned and Spontaneous Settlements............... 124 
XIV CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 
REFERENCES CONSULTED....................................... 130 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1. Location of Dujaila Land Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
2. Plan of Dujaila Land Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
3. Dujaila Settlement Pattern.............................. 30 
4. Typical Land Use on a Dujaila Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
5. Fruit Garden Layout on Dujaila Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the implementation of land 
settlement policies in the context of the socioeconomic, historical and 
political factors associated with rural unemployment and poverty. The 
creation of jobs for people in rural areas is one of the central components of 
national development. 
As population continues to increase in the Third World, the demand for 
rural land increases. The increase in land demand may be attributed to the 
pursuit of the development objectives of population redistribution, increased 
agricultural production, the alleviation of agrarian poverty, and rising 
standards of living. Many developing countries have developed schemes 
labeled as resettlement, land colonization, and land development in order to 
pursue these objectives. 
Despite the substantial amounts that have been invested in such 
schemes, their performance has not been very encouraging. They have 
caused serious concern to settlement officials and policy makers in almost all 
parts of the developing world. They have been costly relative to the numbers 
of people settled, have shown low productivity, and in some cases have had a 
high rate of desertion. Many studies have been conducted concerning this 
subject, including an important one done through the International Labour 
Organization (1977) which examined the experiences of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. 
Little is known about the actual causes of success and failure of 
resettlement schemes. It is not even clear whether such settlements are, in 
fact, an effective way of settling large numbers of people on virgin or 
reclaimed land. 
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Settlement policies have been used to increase agricultural production 
and make idle land productive. Spatial imbalances of population distribution 
have been addressed via settlement policies. For national security, settlement 
policies have been used to exploit frontier lands. Solutions to serious 
political problems including lack of agricultural self-sufficiency, poverty, 
landlessness, and unemployment have been sought through settlement 
policies. 
This study reports the findings of case studies concerning Iraq, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Republic of Tanzania, and 
Israel. A comparative analysis of land settlement policies in Third World 
nations with varying political, social, and economic conditions is presented. 
The choice to study land settlement projects in the aforementioned 
Third World countries emerged from an initial interest in programs in post 
World War Two Iraq. For purposes of comparison, other Third World 
countries with similar social, economic, and cui tural conditions were chosen 
for analysis. The environmental and ecological conditions of the other 
countries were also factors contributing to their selection for case studies. 
Huge amounts of financial resources were invested in these countries' 
planned settlements, however, their performance was not very encouraging. 
If not completely abandoned by settlers, the settlements gave officials, 
planners, and policy makers cause for serious concern. For the most part, 
settlements were costly relative to the number of settlers. In many instances 
agricultural productivity was low. 
It will be shown that land settlement policies in Third World countries, 
by and large, failed to reach objectives and are not now viewed as viable 
options for land development. 
QUESTIONS ADDRESSED 
Following A. S. Oberai (1988) in his edited collection, Land Settlement 
Policies and Population Redistribution in Developing Countries, I will 
address these questions: 
1. Have settlement schemes achieved their stated objectives? 
2. How do income and productivity in settlements compare with other 
areas? 
3. To what extent have planned settlement schemes succeeded in 
improving settlers' socioeconomic well-being? 
4. What are the principal factors that contribute to the success or failure 
of settlement schemes? 
5. What lessons can be learned and applied to future settlement 
schemes? 
I propose to define the success of settlement policy in terms of the 
situation of poor, unemployed, or landless people before and after policy 
implementation. The beneficiaries must be better off, economically and 
socially- including health and education- than before they joined the 
settlement - and soon. I believe that all human beings need more than to eat 
and sleep. Life becomes more complicated over time. In many cases, land 
settlement became an artificial bandage, placed here and there in most Third 
World countries, to give the false impression that governments were 
3 
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working to improve the situation of poor people. Within a few years, all 
such work and expenditures disappeared, and sometimes the condition of the 
settlers was worse than before, to say nothing of the physical scars left on the 
land. If there is to be any development and improvement, the political and 
economic systems of the Third World countries, especially the richer 
countries, must permit people to choose freely their own governments and 
representatives and negotiate development democratically and fairly with the 
people, with a fair distribution of wealth according to the population's 
initiatives. In most richer Third World countries, people are suffering, there 
is poverty, excess government control, executions, jailings and torture, and 
disappearances. 
CHAPTER IT 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THIRD WORLD 
COUNTRIES 
Implementation is especially central to politics in the Third World 
countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Its centrality to the political 
environment of these countries makes it worthy of investigation and 
analysis. Implementation involves more than mechanical translations of 
goals into routine procedures; it involves basic questions about conflict, 
decision making and who gets what in society (Grindle 1980). 
Many researchers have attempted to define the parameters of a general 
process of implementation by cataloging the variables that intervene in it and 
some of the relationships among such variables. According to Grindle (1980) 
there are two questions about implementation in general that are related to 
specific conditions surrounding the execution of public programs in the Third 
World countries. First, what effect does the content of public policy have on 
its implementation, and second, how does the political context of 
administrative action affect policy implementation. Implementation is an 
ongoing process of decision-making by a variety of actors, the ultimate 
outcome of which is determined by the content of program being pursued 
and the interaction of the decision-makers within a given administrative 
context. 
The following case studies illuminate the importance of the content and 
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contextual variables in the implementation process of land settlement 
policies in Third World countries. The case studies provide insights to how 
and why content and contextual variables intervene in the implementation 
process. The generalizations about the implementation process of land 
settlement policies gleaned from these case studies may be useful for analysis 
of other implementation processes. Yet before developing the generalizations 
from these case studies it is important to define more explicitly what is meant 
by implementation, content, and context. 
In general, the task of implementation is to make a link that allows the 
goals of public policies to be realized as outcomes of government activity. It 
involves the creation of a policy delivery system. Thus, public policies of 
goals, objectives, and means are translated into action programs that aim to 
achieve the ends stated in the policy. Then, so that different programs could 
be developed in response to the same policy goals, action programs 
themselves may be disaggregated into more specific projects to be 
administered. 
The purpose of such programs are to cause a change in the policy 
environment. The distinction between policy and program implies that 
policy implementation is a function of program implementation and is 
dependent upon its outcome. It is evident from such an interpretation of 
policy implementation that it involves study and analysis of action programs 
for achieving broader policy goals. This was apparent in the objectives Third 
World governments hoped to achieve, which included; greater agricultural 
productivity, low income housing, rural development, raising the standard of 
living for the poor, employment, health, and education. The Third \A/orld 
governments sought to achieve these objectives through land settlement 
programs; considered a specific program for achieving these goals. 
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The content of public programs and policies is an important element in 
determining the outcome of implementation initiatives. Implementation of 
various programs for instance, to the extent that public actions seek to make 
changes in social, political, and economic relationships, they generally 
stimulate a great deal of opposition from those who's interests are threatened 
by them. An example is landowners who oppose agrarian reform measures. 
A distinction can also be made between programs providing collective 
benefit, which may mobilize more particularistic demands at the 
implementation stage. Programs establishing collective goods such as the 
provision of light and water, health services in rural areas, and in urban slum 
neighborhoods may be readily implemented in the Third World because the 
compliance of groups or localities affected will tend to be forthcoming with a 
minimal amount of conflict (Hadden 1974). A program with great benefits 
such as housing may create conflict and competition among those seeking to 
benefit from them and may be more difficult to execute as intended 
(Rottenbag 19SO). Differences in the degree of behavior change the program 
for its intended beneficiaries is another way the content of policy affects its 
im plemen ta tion. 
The introduction of new technologies for agricultural development is a 
commonly cited example of programs requiring considerable adaptation and 
participation by the recipients. In constrast, providing housing for low 
income people may require little change in the behavior patterns. In the case 
of programs that are designed to achieve long-range objectives, 
implementation may be more difficult than in circumstances where the 
advantages are immediately known by the beneficiaries. As an example, the 
small support and participation that preventative health programs are able to 
elicit from target populations in Third World countries often stands in stark 
contrast to the receptiveness of potential recipients of land titles in rural 
settlements. This is because the latter policy directly affects residents' 
economis situation and sense of security. 
The content of various policies also dictates the site of implementation. 
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An example is housing or agricultural policy that depends upon a network of 
widely dispersed, decision units whose responsibilities are also 
organizationally dispersed. Local and national level agents of the ministry of 
agriculture, agrarian reform department, community development agency, 
public works ministry, and the agricultural credit bank may all be implicated 
as implementors of a rural development policy in any given country. As the 
site of implementation becomes more dispersed, geographically and 
organizationally, the task of executinga particular program becomes more 
difficult, given the increase of decisional units involved (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1980). 
THE CONTEXT OF POUCY 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the policy content is an important 
factor because of the real or potential effect it may have on a given social, 
political and economic setting. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the 
context or environment in which administrative action is pursued. The 
implementation is an ongoing process of decision making involving a 
variety factors affecting the allocation of resources. One of these factors may 
be the attempt by certain people or interest groups to influence decisions. 
Those who might be involved in the implementation of any particular 
program would include national level planners; regional and local 
politicians; economic interest groups, especially at the local level; recipient 
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groups; and bureaucratic implementors at middle and lower levels. The 
people and groups may be intensely or marginally involved in 
implementation, depending on the content of the program and the form in 
which it is administered. Each may have special interest in the program, and 
each may seek to get it by their demand on allocation procedures. The goals 
of such actors will be in direct conflict with each other and the end result of 
this conflict and consequently, who gets what, will be decided by the strategies, 
resources, and power position of each of the individuals involved. 
What is implemented may thus be the result of political maneuvers by 
interest groups competing for scarce resources, the response of implementing 
officials, and the actions of political elites, all interacting within given 
institutional contexts. In such conditions, analysis of the implementation of 
specific programs may imply assessing the power capabilities of the 
individuals, their interests and the strategies for achieving them. This may 
in turn facilitate assessing the potential for achieving policy and program 
goals (Anderson 1972). 
In achieving such goals officials confront two minor problems. First, 
officials must address the problem of how to obtain compliance with the ends 
enunciated in the policy (Kaufman 1973). They must turn the opposition of 
those who may be harmed by the programs into acceptance of them, and they 
must keep those who are excluded but who wish to acquire benefits from 
subverting them. Obtaining this kind of compliance may mean much 
bargining accomodation and again considerable conflict. But if overall policy 
goals are to be realized, the resources traded to acquire compliance must not 
jeopardize the impact or focus of specific programs. 
This first problem is exacerbated by special interests and groups 
competing for scarce resources, the response of implementing officials, and 
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the action of political elites, all interacting within given institutional contexts. 
Analysis of the implementation of specific programs may imply assessing the 
power capabilities of the individual, their interests, and the strategies for 
achieving them. This in turn may facilitate assessing the potential for 
achieving policy and program goals (Anderson 1972). 
The second problem of achieving policy and program goals within a 
specific environment is that of responsiveness. Bureaucracies must be 
responsive to the needs of those to benefit in order to serve them the best way 
possible. In addition, without a great deal of responsiveness during 
implementation, public officials are deprived of information to evaluate 
program achievement and of support important to its success. In many cases, 
however, responsiveness may mean that policy goals are not achieved 
because of the intervention of the individuals or groups. Either in order to 
acquire specific types of goods or services in greater amounts, or to obstruct 
the accomplishment of particular programs that may not be as beneficial to 
them. The problem for policy administrators is to ensure an adequate degree 
of responsiveness to provide flexibility, support, and feedback, while at the 
same time maintaining enough control over the distribution of resources to 
achieve the stated goals (Emmerson 1974). 
POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
Political participation and competition in implementing public policies 
in Third World countries may be viewed as by-products of the political 
systems themselves. Distance and remoteness, inaccessibility of the policy 
making process to most people, and extensive competition caused by 
widespread need and very scarce resources are just few of the contextual 
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factors affecting the implementation process. However, in many Third 
World countries, the output stage of the implementation process is where the 
demands of individual and collective interests emerge and conflict resolved 
(Weiner 1962). 
In the Third World countries, political parties are more important as 
mechanisms by which elites control mass followings than as means by which 
interests are articulated from below to government leadership. This is true in 
regimes in which single or dominant parties direct the political stage. In 
other countries parties may be vehicles for the personal ambitions of 
individual politicians who have no real commitment to achieving goals 
beyond obtaining government jobs and distributing them to loyal followers 
(Lande 1973). 
Interest groups may be similarly ineffective as structures for presenting 
collective demands to the political leadership. Interest associations are 
frequently captive organizations of ruling parties. They exist only at the 
power and indulgence of the government, or like parties are formed for the 
single purpose of protecting the political interests of their leadership. Beside 
these problems, other constraints on their aggregative capacities include 
limited communication facilities, dispersed potential membership, and lack 
of education and experience. These characteristics mean that frequently there 
are few organizations that are capable of representing the interests of broad 
categories of citizens and formulating policies responsive to their particular 
needs. Those few that are effective in this role tend to be the wealthy and 
powerful groups such as bankers, landowners and industrialists. 
Related to the weakness of interest aggregating mechanisms in Third 
World countries is the frequently encountered attitude of leaders in both 
political and administrative positions that participation in the policy 
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formulation process is illegitimate or inefficient. Their concern for rapid 
development and the central role of the public sector in achieving economic 
and social goals may lead them to give policy making responsibility to elite 
planning bodies in the national capital. These elite planning bodies may then 
be protected from the pressures (pettiness or selfishness) exerted by interest 
and clientle groups, and from the delays and conflich resulting from open 
debate, inputs for legislative bodies, and exposure to mass media. 
The policies of a regime have great impact on the daily lives of citizens 
in nearly every Third World country. Many Third World countries have 
extensive and active public sectors involved in many aspects of economic and 
social life. State bureacracies may be among the strongest institutions in the 
society. Many of the most important policies established by political elites 
include agrarian reform, urban development, housing, social security, health, 
employment and education. Each of these policies are of concern to virtually 
all citizens. Furthermore, in a context of very scarce resources, who gets what 
and how much is likely to be of central concern to the populace. Government 
plans where to locate industries, who should receive government contracts, 
or who should be included in preventative health programs will likely ignite 
the potential for conflict and the desire to influence such decisions. Thus, 
while participation is frequently limited to policy making, there still exists a 
great desire among citizens to affect the outcome of government decision 
making because such outcomes affect them all down to a personal level. 
Many Third World countries have found the implementatin phase of 
the policy process to be particularly suited to their needs. In attempts to 
obtain government goods and services, individuals and groups find it 
worthwhile to focus their demand making efforts on officials and agencies 
empowered to distribute benefits, or on politicians who may have influence 
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on individual allocation. Patron factions, client linkages, ethnic ties, and 
personal coalitions that are often the basis of political activity are well suited 
to making individualized demands on the bureaucratic systems for the 
allocation of goods and services (Heeger 1973). 
The implementation process may be the major way in which 
individuals and groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete 
for access to scarce resources. It may even be the principle of the interaction 
between the government and its citizens, between public officials and their 
constituents. More over, the outcome of this competition and interaction can 
determine both the content and the impact of programs established by 
government elites, and thus influence the course of a country's development. 
With the concentration of political activity on the implementation process, it 
is likely that policies and programs will be more difficult to manage and 
predict, and even more subject to changes or alteration in the Third World 
countries than elsewhere. 
Implementation of public policies in the Third World countries is the 
focus of the case studies in this text. Specifically, land settlement programs 
intended to benefit certain groups of peoples in the societies studied. The 
intended beneficiaries include primarily the rural poor and landless peoples. 
The overwhelming characteristic of Third World countries are the large 
proportions of their populations that live below, at, or slightly above 
subsistence level. These portions of the populations are in dire need of the 
goods and services provided by government programs. Yet, most Third 
World governments are authoritarian and too busy seeking solutions to 
problems of political participation and conflicts to be deeply involved in 
providing the basic needs for its citizens. This suggests that the capacity of 
poor populations to acquire benefits from their government may be strictly 
limited in an environment that minimizes the influence of numbers on 
political decision making through the elimination of open elections and 
rotation of political leadership. 
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Most of the case studies in this text illuminate the general methods of 
implementation and the political activity associated with it. Most of the 
Third World countries exhibit implementation of policies that are 
distributive or redistributive, including public land for the landless, rural 
development, and increase in agricultural production. The implementation 
of policies is done through governments which determine how scarce 
resources will be allocated and who should be the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries 
of policy implementation, generally low income and low status groups, are 
presented in these case studies as powerless people who strive to elicit 
resources and responses from their government in the face of considerable 
opposition from those who are threatened by them. 
The literature of land settlement policy implementation provides a 
framework to help analyze the many variables which interfere with 
implementation. The variables identified in the case studies of Third World 
countries presented in this text. These variables are components of the 
content and context of the the policy environment. The variable include 
national level planners; national, regional, and local politicians; economic 
elites; recipient groups; and bureaucratic implementors and resources. 
Land settlement has been initiated to solve some of the problems 
confronting Third World countries, including the need to increase 
agricultural production, correct spatial imbalance, and difuse serious political 
problems resulting from the existing agrarian structure. The major focus of 
this study on the resettlement schemes is from the point of view of the 
populations concerned in relation to the objectives of the policy 
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implementation. This study reports the findings from examination of land 
settlement programs in Iraq, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Somalia, 
Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Israel. 
These studies present the similarities and differences in the policies of 
land settlement programs. This examination of land settlement policies is an 
attempt to identify the problems facing such projects and to learn what 
should be done to improve the settlement programs. 
There are three sections in Chapter XII which provide discussion. First, 
the performance of settlement projects, concentrating on the extent to which 
they achieved their objectives. Second, the major economic and social 
problems confronting settlement programs. Third, whether resettlements are 
an appropriate policy response to population redistribution. Chapter XIII 
presents discussion examining the factors affecting success or failure of land 
settlement policies. 
CHAPTER ill 
INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES 
The importance of developing national resettlement programs in Third 
World nations have often been couched in their potential for providing tidy 
solutions to numerous problems. Problems faced by these nations have 
included the need to increase agricultural production, correct spatial 
imbalances in population distribution, exploit frontier land for reasons of 
national security. Third World nations have also cited the need to diffuse 
potentially serious problems resulting from existing agrarian structures, 
poverty, and increasing landlessness and unemployment (Oberai 1988). 
Pressing land tenure problems in the arid areas of Iraq were the impetus 
for the development of land settlement projects following World War II. A 
resettlement project known as the Dujaila pilot plan, the first of its kind in 
Iraq following World War II, was implemented to address problems of land 
tenure. 
The idea of trying to alleviate population pressure and poverty in Java, 
Indonesia by organizing and encouraging the movement of people to the 
outer islands of Indonesia is one example of a resettlement program. During 
the 1970s, fueled by the oil boom, Indonesia's transmigration program became 
one of the largest voluntary land settlement programs in the world (Arndt 
and Sundrum 1977, Arndt 1981, Hull 1981). 
The objective of Indonesia's population transfer was economically based 
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rather than for the the relief of population pressure. The lack of 
infrastructural facilities, such as housing, drinking water, roads and irrigation 
was the primary factor in settler's decisions to abandon the land settlement 
scheme. 
Malaysia, a relative newcomer to implementing land settlement 
schemes, developed a style of implementation that received worldwide 
attention due to its performance. The emergence of resettlement programs 
among other southeast Asian nations can be traced back to the turn of the 
20th century. Though the Malaysian programs did not begin until the mid 
1950s, in less than a span of 30 years large tracts of land have been developed 
and occupied by previously poor and landless peasants (Bahrin 1968, 1977). 
In Malaysia, population redistribution in and of itself was never an 
objective of land settlement and development. In part, it was seen as a means 
for promoting regional development. The principal objective was to develop 
land for the landless and unemployed people. 
Among the various objectives of the Philippine government were the 
use of resettlement programs to improve the quality of life among the poor, 
increase agricultural production, and accelerate national and regional 
development through exploration and colonization of the frontier. This 
involved the distribution of publicly owned agricultural land to landless 
families. Resettlement has also been used by the government to encourage 
migration to sparsely populated regions of the hinterlands for the purpose of 
developing new communities that would serve to fulfill desired objectives 
(Din 1981). The program in the Philippines was driven in part by a 1971 
report prepared by a consultant for the Harvard Advisory Group which 
advocated the abrogation of the land grant system and proposed a 
comprehensive planned utilization of government lands through an 
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appropriate settlement policy. Support of individual initiative and low cost 
settlement programs were key elements of the Philippine resettlement policy 
and were attributable to the report (Pascual 1966, Simkins 1968, World Bank 
1973). 
The policy of resettling Somalia's nomadic population predated the 197 4 
drought. However, the international aid extended to Somalia in response to 
the drought brought its policy into greater focus and added momentum to its 
implementation. The major objective of the resettlement policy as it evolved 
since 1974 was to attain a major redistribution of Somalia's population so as 
to reduce the ecological deterioration of the rangelands and to redirect urban 
growth into productive rural enterprises. By developing large-scale irrigation 
schemes and coastal and deep-sea fishing, the Somalia government hoped to 
diversify the national economy in order to achieve greater national self-
sufficiency and reduce the country's increasing trade deficit. Secondary, but 
not less important, were the goals of population redistribution (Cassanelli 
1975), provision of social services to Somalia tribes, and accommodate war 
refugees (Scuddert 1981, Afzal 1983). 
The settlements of Somalia were successful in creating social 
infrastructures for many families, but income and production potential were 
not met. Education and health care at the settlements were well above the 
national average. Increases in elementary school involvement were noted. 
From 1961 to 1966 the United Republic of Tanzania adopted land 
settlements as part of their national planning strategy for socioeconomic 
development. The objectives were increased agricultural production, and 
population redistribution from heavily populated areas to areas of low 
population densities. Other objectives included provision of essential social 
services such as health care, education and clean water (Maro 1982, 1983). 
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The United Republic of Tanzania sought a complete transformation of 
rural society to improve the overall social and economic well-being of the 
nation through the villagization program. The villagization program was an 
attempt by the government to evolve a coherent rural development strategy 
with the aim of communal production and to engage in the collectivization 
of rural development. Despite the villagization project, levels of agricultural 
production were low and rural income remained inadequate. 
Ethiopia, one of the largest nations in Africa with a population of nearly 
35 million during the 1970s, experienced problems with settlements. There 
was a great potential for developing land and moving people from high 
density areas to low density areas. The major objective was to settle about 
500,000 people after the 1974 drought. The settlements proved not to be well-
balanced. Most settlers concentrated in large numbers in the highlands. The 
land became fragmented, creating great pressures which led to low 
agricultural productivity and landlessness (Kassaye 1978). 
Israel was considered a pioneer state with extensive experience in land 
settlement planning and implementation. Israel's objectives were guided by 
the priority to utilize uncultivated land as part of rural development. 
The intended policies of resettlement programs throughout Third 
World nations have differed to varying degrees, but some commonalties 
have emerged. Most often, the clear of objective of relocating people was 
initially met. Yet whether the relocated population remained and prospersed 
depended in large degree to the strategies for implementation. 
CHAPTER IV 
DUJAILA LAND SETTLEMENT IN IRAQ 
Dujaila was a pilot land settlement project. Begun in 1945 it was the first 
project of its kind in an Arab Middle Eastern country (in the Arabian 
Peninsula) and the forerunner of a large scale social experiment. It was 
significant in that it was all Iraqi-conceived and executed. The first Iraqi 
projects attempted to solve the pressing land tenure problems of the arid area 
of Iraq. The thought was if the coming years proved as successful for Dujaila 
as the preceding six years, this pilot project would pave the way for five more 
larger projects of a similar type planned in Bagdad. Other Middle Eastern 
governments were watching the development closely. Their agrarian 
problems were not totally dissimilar, and they hoped to learn much from the 
work of this project. 
The project was conceived before the Second World War, but was not 
initiated before completion of the barrage on the Tigris River at Kut (Fig. 1). 
The barrage could raise summer water levels in the river by almost 14 feet. It 
functioned to draw water over the southern banks of the Tigris by gravity. 
The barrage was completed in 1939. War prevented action on the Dujaila 
project until 1945. Since its inception in 1945, the project, with its initial one 
hundred settler families, grew quickly under definite rules (Fisk 1951) 
Each applicant was given a 100-meshara plot (each meshara = 2500 square 
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Figure 1. Location of Dujaila land settlement. About 
100 miles southeast of Bagdad (Fisk 1951). 
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old yet under 50 years old, with no criminal record. Each settler was required 
to live with their family on the land they tilled and worked. Preferably, the 
settlers were residents of one of the two southeastern provinces of Iraq, 
formerly known as Kut and Ammra, now called Messan. Where the Dujaila 
projects were located with this stipulation, the government avoided mixing 
people from different tribal backgrounds. Alternatively, great care was taken 
to settle people of different local tribes adjacent to each other to promote 
amalgamation and long-range harmony between the settlers. 
In 1945 the government established the Dujaila Project Board, which 
required that settlers abide by the instructions given to them. In this way, the 
government through the Board was able to introduce techniques and crops 
that the settlers were not previously acquainted with. Each settler signed the 
development and cultivation contract created by the Project Board which 
included information about crop rotation, planting fruit trees and vegetable 
gardens, cleaning and digging of feeder canals, and housing style and 
construction. Each settler family was granted 100 Iraqi dinars1 as an 
establishment loan, repayable in five years. Settlers were not allowed to sell, 
lease or rent their land for a 10-year period. During this time the settlers' only 
source of credit was the Agricultural Bank of Iraq. Any settler who disobeyed 
these instructions after three warnings from the project authorities could be 
ousted and the land opened for resettlement (Al-Haidari 1950). 
In return, those who abided by these regulations were granted a 100-
donnom area plot of land, a free water supply, and the establishment loan. 
They were encouraged to make full use of the cooperative associations, 
demonstration farms, educational programs, and technical advice available 
on the project. After 10 years settlers received their land and all rights as a gift 
1 An Iraqi dinar was equal to 4 U.S. dollars at that time. 
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from the government. In case of a settler's death, the land passed to his heirs 
under identical contractual requirements. 
These regulations were a spirited effort to develop small independent 
settlements comprised of responsible landowning people. It was hoped that 
their improved living standards would set an example and influence labor 
conditions on adjacent, privately owned land. It was thought that the change 
in labor conditions would encourage other farmers to desire independence 
from communities. 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The Dujaila Land 
Flat subtropical desert land lying east of the Mesopotamian market 
center of Kut City (Fig. 2) was the site of the Dujaila project. The Dujaila 
project was comprised of 125,000 donnem which had been allocated by the 
Iraqi government. The land was divided equally between a few wealthy 
landowners and the Iraqi government. As the Dujaila project was too new to 
have had any substantial influence upon the privately held lands, except as 
beneficiaries of the project's water and machinery availability discussion of 
these lands will not follow. 
The land used by the settlers in the project for agricultural purposes was 
an area that could be covered by gravity pump from the Dujaila Canal and its 
12 distributor channels, a total area of 110,000 donnem. Nearly all of this land 
was potentially productive desert land at the beginning of the project. Eighty 
thousand (80,000) donnem could be irrigated by pump, and of this land, 20% 
was too sandy for use. Administration, utilities, schools, roads and 
experimental farms occupied a minimal area. 
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Water Policy of the Project 
Dujaila water was distributed to state land only, except in specific 
instances where the government Council of Ministers allowed private 
landowners specified quantities. In return for this water, landowners (called 
Shayhk) determined whether to distribute one-fourth of their land to the 
farmers or pay a pro rata share (1.25) of Iraqi dinar per donnem of the 
expenditures incurred in constructing the canal system. Water distribution 
was accomplished through the Dujaila canal, leaving the right bank of the 
Tigris River 300 meters (about 1050 feet) upstream from the Kut City barrage. 
The canal control by headgates was designed to pass 28 cubic meters per 
second, which is enough water to supply both flow irrigation and the slightly 
higher irrigation lands. The canal, while designed to carry enough water for 
both kinds of irrigation, was excavated to a three-meter depth, allowing but 
18.5 cuses (unit equal to one cubic foot per second) discharge. This was the 
full cultivation water required for flow irrigation. When money was made 
available for pumps, the canal and its seven distributary branches inside 
project land were enlarged to full capacity. The distributaries, of unequal size 
due to variations in the water of each area, were designed to a slope of 10 
centimeters per kilometer, while the average slope of the Dujaila itself was 7 
centimeters per kilometer throughout its 51 kilometer length. Modern steel 
headgates were used to regulate the flow of water from the main canal into its 
several distributaries and from these to the feeder channels irrigating 
individual farms. 
The Administration and Facilities 
Project lands were divided into many sections and segregated according 
to the distributary canal servicing each particular section. The original settlers 
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were located on Sections Seven and Eight, which were nearest to Kut City. 
Subsequent settlers were located on land at a greater distance along the canal. 
The administrative services were an integral part of the project. 
Experimental farms, scattered in several of the project's sections, were one of 
the two means by which the government disseminated its advice and 
concepts of modern farming. The farms, of the same size as the settlers' 100 
donnom plots, made use only of tools available to the settlers themselves and 
produced those crops which the government required each settler to grow. By 
practicing advanced cultivation techniques and producing heavier crop 
yields, often with fewer man-hours of labor, the experimental farms 
successfully convinced cultivators of the value of their techniques. 
The experimental farms would have been more effective if limited to 
the single function of education via demonstration. As it was, they were 
under-staffed even for that function and had to also serve as horticultural 
advisor for planting trees and vines and as seed nurseries for the entire 
Dujaila project. There were not as many experimental farms as there were 
sections within the project. Because of the distance involved, the settlers' 
visits to these farm sites are sharply curtailed, greatly reducing their effect. In 
addition to the experimental farm plots, skilled agriculturalists living in the 
project offered demonstration lectures on specific local farming problems. 
Often these lectures were supplemented by machinery demonstrations. It was 
hoped that future growth of these educational efforts would include the 
introduction of visual aid techniques, particularly since many of the settlers 
had never seen such demonstrations. 
Local administration was carried out by a small government staff 
stationed in the project. The staff was charged with enforcing the law and 
rules of the Dujaila project and with supplementing the activity of the 
resident technicians. Provisions for health and education, both adult and 
primary, were inadequate beyond the section center. 
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The consumer and farm cooperatives were the most important services 
rendered to the farmers in Dujaila. The cooperatives were conducted entirely 
by the indigenous agricultural population. For a yearly subscription of one 
Iraqi dinar, each farm family could take advantage of the consumer 
cooperative's services, purchasing personal and household goods at well 
below the prevailing market price. The consumer cooperative, in common 
with the farmer supply cooperative, maintained a retail outlet in the 
administrative center located in each section. Membership in both forms of 
the cooperative was open to officially recognized Dujaila settlers only, because 
of the minimal cost of and the benefits offered by these cooperatives (Fisk 
1951). 
The Farm Supply Cooperative was very important as it furnished 
needed farm machinery and seeds to small landholders. Tractors, with their 
supplementary equipment, including driver and petrol, were available for the 
nominal price of 300 Iraqi fils (about $0.70 at that time) per donnom. Tractors 
and maintenance stations manned by full-time specialists, were located in the 
fully settled sections of the project. Unfortunately, mechanical equipment 
was in short supply, opening the way for petty abuse, which was encouraged 
by the fact that the cooperative could rent the same equipment for the 
profitable rate of 600 fils per donnom to the neighboring landlord owning 
land in the privately held land watered by the Dujaila Canal. Most cultivators 
signed up for equipment as much as three to six months prior to their actual 
need for it, to insure their obtaining its use. The Farm Supply Cooperative, 
which was a voluntary organization, charged members two Iraqi dinar per 
year for the privilege of using its facilities, although new settlers are allowed 
lenient terms their first few years. This sum plus governmental assistance 
supported the nonprofit operation of the organization as a cooperative 
society. 
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The cooperatives were the government's agents for increasing both the 
quality and quantity of crop output. As this depended upon the use of 
improved varieties of seed, specialized cotton and cereal seeds were available 
through the cooperatives at attractively low prices. The availability of low 
cost seed to settlers benefitted the government's goals of increasing crop 
quality and quantity. 
The good success of the cooperatives turned the Project Board's attention 
toward a marketing cooperative. It was hoped that this activity would be 
functioning before the 1952 harvest season. Farmers, for many years 
accustomed to selling their crops to town grain merchants far in advance of 
the harvest, had been unable to change their ways. As a result, they lost 50% 
or more of the final market value of their harvested crops. Local grain 
merchants and landlords, feeling threatened, objected strongly to the plan for 
a marketing cooperative. Only the insistence of the Dujaila Project Board put 
the marketing cooperative plan into the starting stage. Unfortunately, 
landowners possessed disproportionate political strength. Marketing 
cooperatives presented an immediate threat to their way of earning extra 
wealth and such plans were vigorously opposed. 
One satisfying introduction by the administration were the tree plantings 
along the public roads uniting several sections and their administrative 
center. Many different trees were planted such as eucalyptus, poplar, 
mulberry and tamarisk, all quick-growing varieties that thrive under 
irrigation. They were interspersed with sisbania and casuarina bushes, acting 
to disrupt the monotonous flatness of the southern Mesopotamian plain. 
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This vegetation sheltered settlers from awesome dust storms and provided 
nice shade in the summer. 
Dujaila Project Population and Social Life 
Estimates indicate that between 1000 and 1200 families were in residence 
as of June 1951. The population was estimated at about 15,000 people. Each 
family averaged between five and seven persons. In addition, approximately 
the same number of hired laborers and their families were supposed to be 
living on project land. The landowner was free to employ one man and his 
family, from any place he chose. The settler himself however had to meet the 
qualifications according to the Project regulations. When sufficient 
applications had been received by the Project board, actual settlers were 
chosen from among qualified applicants by lottery. By 1951, farmers wishing 
land in Dujaila had to show that they had completed both their primary 
education and military service (Al-Haidari 1950). 
Additional labor was needed in the Project only at harvest time. Then 
local shepherds were employed for a few weeks to harvest and thresh grain. 
In return for their labor, they were paid both in cash and kind, receiving 
board and a space in the grain fields to pitch their tents. They were allowed to 
graze their animals on the stubble for a limited post-harvest period. This was 
in late May and June. 
Dujaila 's Homestead 
The Dujaila homesteads, shown in Figure 3, were laid out in square 
shapes or rectangular patterns aligned to conform to a grid pattern of 
irrigation canals. Each group of four formed a small settlement of 4 to 12 
buildings containing between 40 and 50 people. The law requiring 
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settlers actually to dwell on their own land was intended to insure that the 
cultivator and owner were the same person. This dispersed settlement 
pattern in Iraq was also intended to reduce public security requirements. 
Some incidence of crime was reduced successfully within the Dujaila Project. 
The settlement pattern requirement worked great hardship upon the settlers, 
although it eliminated travel time from village to farm. Accustomed to 
dwelling in villages, the sociable tribal people resented being relegated to such 
minute settlements. The great distance,often exceeding 10 kilometers 
between farm houses and administrative centers of individual sections 
contributed to diminished attendance at demonstrative lectures and schools. 
Frequent exchange of individual farm experiences was also curtailed, a very 
serious fault among an illiterate population. 
This settlement scheme had a twofold effect on water use. The 
provision of pure, piped water over great distances for individual household 
use proved cost prohibitive. Furthermore, diversion of water for household 
use reduced its availability for the all-purpose irrigation ditches. Individual 
wells may have solved the drinking water problem if small pumps were 
installed at each of the four corners of the settlements. The social services 
problem was more fundamental. Small settlements in hexagonal patterns, 
with farms surrounding each village at distances no greater than 4 kilometers 
relative to surrounding villages may have provided an answer for future 
settlement projects under consideration in Bagdad at the time. 
Soils 
The soil's rich loam, with occasional sandy patches, constituted the thin 
topsoil layer. Because of the high salt content of the surface layer, shallow-
rooted cereal and cotton crops could not be expected to produce as abundantly 
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as was possible on the well-drained lands found in the north of the country. 
Alternatively, the loamy subsoil had a below-average salt content. This 
favored immediate results when the soil was washed, thereby lessening the 
pernicious influence of topsoil salts. Unfortunately, the loam had a poor 
structure, tending in places to cake thickly enough to prevent seedlings from 
pushing through the dried-out surface. This condition prompted the 
introduction of long-rooted leguminous crops, like alfalfa and clover, to 
improve the soil structure. In addition, these crops supplied needed humic 
content (Powers 1954, Buringh 1955). 
Such crops as Berseem were excellent winter crops, while alfalfa 
provided good summer forage. Both crops increased the production of 
animal protein and products by supplying a reliable fodder crop. The 
introduction of such crops also gave the settler a better understanding of new 
fixed location agriculture as contrasted with the extensive, shifting irrigation 
cultivation practiced over most of the country. Alternation in salt and 
nutrient content, as well as changes in soil structure, were responsible for the 
variations in crop quality and density readily observable in the fields (Lebon 
1964). 
By the sixth year of the project salt was not a problem. However, the 
lowest lands were removed from cultivation and the settlers occupying these 
salted plots were relocated. The key issue in the Project was that drainage was 
not provided for in the original plans of the Dujaila land as a whole. This is 
why older portions of the settlement salted up beyond reclamation (Simmons 
1965). Temporary local drains could have been constructed to lead excess 
water off to the lowlands east of the canal, where the waters would have been 
disposed of through evaporation. If such a project was to be permanent and 
free from malarial swamps, large drains would have to have been dug back to 
33 
the Tigris from the projects. Pumps could have been employed to lift the 
water back into the river again. The area of land at the eastern end of Dujaila 
was fertile, and could be commanded in its entirety by flow irrigation. But it 
was subject to temporary coverage by water during high floods and therefore 
susceptible to malaria breeding. 
Soil erosion was a minor but neglected factor within the Project. Erosion 
control included only the banks of the main canal and its distributaries. The 
richness of the desert's extremely fertile loam, deposited mainly by the Tigris' 
accumulation of fertile alluvium was substantial, yet the rich soil was not 
necessary except for certain field crops such as cotton. Animal manure was 
either collected for fuel or sometimes scattered upon the vegetable or fruit 
trees. Some manure was left to enrich the area left for pastures attached to 
each farm of the settlement. 
Crop Rotation Practice 
The rotation of crops was not new to the Iraqi farmer, but it was a very 
important factor for permanent farmers. The practice had been used by 
leaving a field fallow. That meant one year a farm was left without 
cultivation until the following year. But the system adopted for the Dujaila 
settlement was more in line with the extensive, shifting agriculture practiced 
on private lands near Dujaila. For example, the grain crops, such as wheat 
and barley, were on the same plot of land as shown in Figure 4. A three-
donnom area of cotton was located in different fields with each passing 
summer, thereby taking advantage of the scattered patches of good soil on 
each farm. The vegetable patch remained close to the farm bulking to make it 
easier for car access and fertilizing with animal manure. The fruit trees 
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Figure 4. Typical land use on a Dujaila farm (Fisk 1951). 
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near the farm buildings. The most appropriate rotation may have been a 
three-year rotation of cotton, berseem clover, and wheat and barley. Such a 
system would have involved two winter crops and one summer crop on each 
field. One winter and two periods of summer fallow within each rotation 
cycle could yield greater crop production from the same land area. A three-
donnum plot of alfalfa could be rotated about the poorer soil patches once in 
each cycle, improving structure and organic content and providing additional 
fodder for the settler's animals. 
The crops used in the settlement farm were typical of Iraqi agricultural 
field crops. Wheat and barley were the dominant cash crops and occupied 
most cultivated land in north and south Mesopotamia including the Dujaila 
Project. Wheat was used for bread and barley was used for bread and exported 
for beer production. Both crops were grown in shallow basins that were 
flooded three to four times a month during winter. The actual watering 
interval depended upon temperatures and evaporation rate. The common 
harvesting method was by hand sickle, and grains were loosened in the husks 
by animal's hooves. Wind winnowing then completed the threshing process. 
Sometimes threshing was done by wooden sledge, with has rotating steel 
blades and a roller, to give shorter lengths of straw used for winter feeding of 
the animals and for mud bricks for home construction. The extra cereals 
produced for sale are marketed by the individual farmer in an unprofitable 
old manner, in which the town middleman absorbed the bulk of profit. But 
in the later years of the project, the cooperative marketing was very helpful to 
remedy the situation. 
Grains were grown as winter cereals, keeping the farmer busy plowing 
and sowing in the fall, watering in the winter and harvesting in the spring. 
Cotton, a summer crop, was grown on a small area to give the farmer a year-
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round farming income, albeit small. Crops, such as com, sorghums, mung 
beans, millet, sesame, and other vegetables were raised on a small scale as a 
summer crop. 
The tree orchard was introduced to the Dujaila settlement as an integral 
part of the Project's crop and diet diversification. Diversification was central 
the Project's goal of increasing the self-sufficiency of individual farms and 
teaching farmers the desired potential of their new life. As shown in Figure 
5, some gardens planted in 1946 yielded excellent crops of grapes; and the 
greenery around these established farms formed a refreshing contrast to the 
dull mud villages of the large estates adjacent to the Dujaila Project. The 
produce from these gardens were only for home consumption, because the 
area devoted to each variety of fruit was too small to encourage sale. Rapidly 
growing mulberry and eucalyptus trees and the casuarina and sisbania bushes 
acted as partial windbreaks around the houses. They also provided cooking 
fuel for the individual household. 
The vegetable garden, like the orchard, was cultivated under open border 
and trench irrigation, receiving water once every three to four days. From 
this five-donnom plot each family was expected to supply its own needs for 
vegetables. At the inception of the Project growing vegetables was considered 
an inferior occupation, so farmers needed to be educated on how to tend their 
vegetable plots until they had seen the advantage of growing and consuming 
their own vegetables. As a result of the wide variety of food freely available 
to each household from their gardens it was hoped that the general health 
would be raised well above those farmers laboring nearby on the landlord 
plantations. 
1. Building ; 2. Fig Tree ; 3. Mulberry Trees ; 4. Date Palms ; 
5. Pomegranates ; Plum Trees ; 7. Greengage Plums ; 8. Vines 
9. Crabapples; 10. Apricot Trees ; 11. Apple Trees 
Figure 5. Fruit garden layout on Dujaila farm (Fisk 1951). 
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Livestock in Dujaila 
The goal of agricultural diversification in the Dujaila Project led to the 
introduction of livestock such as cows for milk, and poultry and ducks for 
eggs and meat. Donkeys normally were kept in each farm for transportation. 
Some farms had about 30 head of sheep for wool and lambs, with a few goats 
for milk. The animals grazing the grain stubble helped the settlers to support 
more animals than would otherwise be possible. Diversified agricultural 
production made it essential for the settler, in order to profit, to add 
leguminous crops which helped the soil's fertility. 
Settler Adjustment 
The settlers' adjustment was very slow in the beginning because nearly 
all of them were not familiar with the new environment or many of the 
crops. However, by 1951 the settlers had realized the value of such crops. 
They had become free of the debt they used to have under their landlord. 
Most of them possessed cash incomes, and they had good diets. Freedom 
replaced the feudal system, and enhanced health increased their ability to 
enjoy new status and well-being. With good housing, with greenery around 
such houses, better clothing and some home furnishings, they became more 
active and interested in their lives. Some of them considered themselves 
prosperous enough to have extra wives. In general, the settlers of the Dujaila 
Project became ambassadors promoting such settlements in other parts of 
Iraq.* 
*As county agent at this time, the author was informed of the preceding by Hasan Mohammud Ali, 
director of Dujaila project, and Fuad Izzet, first technical secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Iraq. 
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Did the settlers adjust to the new way of life? The adjustments were 
very slow in the beginning, because they were not familiar with the 
environment. Nor were they familiar with cash crops and the time required 
to produce them. But when their diet and their health improved, they 
recognized the value, and they were more than ready to accept their new 
ways. Financially they were better off than before. They were free of debt and 
possessed some cash incomes. They enjoyed the freedom to be their own 
bosses and the ability to enjoy their new status. Especially with good housing, 
often with attractive greenery around their houses, with better clothing and 
some home furnishings they became more interested in life beyond the limits 
of their farms. Dujaila settlers considered themselves prosperous people. 
The Dujaila Project yielded practical experience for the Iraqi government. 
Certain points had been clarified during the first six years, which pointed out 
what must be done to improve the Project and extend the Dujaila idea to 
other parts of Iraqi. Social, health and education services were in the first 
stage of development and inadequate. Recreational facilities were totally 
lacking. There were no medical services on the Project. 
I've primarily discussed the successes of the Dujaila project during its 
first six years of existence. The problems the pilot project faced included an 
inadequate drainage system and consequent diminishment of crop 
production. The drainage system failed to prevent the toxic build-up of salt. 
Crop failure due to increased salt content discouraged settlers and left them 
frustrated with their efforts (Fisk 1951). By the end of the six year period 
examined many settlers had abandoned their plots and moved elsewhere, 
leaving the whole project in a state similar to a salt mine (Phillips 1959). 
CHAPTER V 
LAND SETILEMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
Tanzania, similar to many countries in Africa, has adopted land 
settlement policies as part of their national planning scheme. The primary 
objectives were increased agricultural production and improved 
socioeconomic development. A secondary objective was population 
redistribution via relocation of landless and displaced peoples from heavily 
populated areas to areas of low population density. 
From 1961-1966, the Tanzania government tried to transform agriculture 
through capital-intensive settlements; these were limited and affected only 
100,000 people. But in 1967, the government proclaimed the Arush 
Declaration. In the spirit of the philosophy of socialism, the Declaration set 
the stage for collectivization of the entire rural population into nucleated 
settlements called Ujamaa villages. The Arush Declaration and its precepts 
were viewed as a precondition for rural development. Both the policy and 
the strategies of implementation visualized a future society based on 
nucleated settlements in which land and labor were mobilized for 
cooperative and communal production. Equitable income distribution would 
be encouraged through such a settlement pattern as would cheaper and 
cheaper provision of social services. The land settlement and population 
redistribution in Tanzania had two eras (Boesen 1979, Hyden 1980). 
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Tanzania had some experience with land settlement during British 
Colonial rule. Such rule was used during 193D-1940 to concentrate peasants 
into compact settlements. This was one of the colonial system's methods to 
increase the agricultural production. In the 1950's, the colonial government 
encouraged cash crop agricultural settlements. 
The objective of colonial agricultural policy was to increase production, 
especially of cash crops. Such policies were improvements in traditional 
agricultural practices in soil conservation, terracing and land use planning. 
There was no emphasis on the introduction of new methods, new techniques 
or innovation, nor any concern for welfare of the peasant producers or the 
provision of social services. The consequence of such colonial agricultural 
policies was anticolonial resistance on the part of the peasants, which finally 
mobilized into a mass nationalist movement delUt'Ulding self~rule 
government. 
POST -COLONIAL SETILEMENT 
In 1962 the independent United Republic of Tanzania had been advised 
by the World Bank to establish land settlements on vacant land by removing 
people from crowded or high-density areas to new land. The World Bank 
suggested movement of people to new land would encourage them to be 
more open to change and adoption of new ways of agriculture. The 
government establ·r.shed the Village Settlement Agency to supervise and 
advise settlers and government agents regarding implementation. According 
agency directives, pilot planned settlements were established in various parts 
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of the country as centers of modem farming. They numbered 20, with 
populations of 20,000 people. Each settlement was to have 250 families, with 
managers and other experts in agriculture. All machinery used in the 
settlements was paid for by the government. 
Unfortunately, five years after their inception, most of the pilot 
settlements were abandoned, but some were converted to Ujamaa villages. 
By 1966 the Village Settlement Agency had been dissolved. The 
transformation of agriculture through the settlements had failed for three 
reasons. First, overcapitalization: in many of the schemes, there was more 
machinery than necessary in relation to land and labor. Consequently, both 
labor and equipment were underutilized. Second, production was low and 
scattered in many farms that could not be easily supervised. Third, the 
settlements were managed by inexperienced officials, with no settler 
participation in management (Dumon 1969). 
SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENTS 
In addition to the many government-supervised settlements, there were 
many voluntary settlements that were on a cooperative basis and received 
some assistance from the government. Some of these settlements were 
motivated by an urban youth organization named Tanu Youth League (TYL). 
Settlements established by TYL were self-reliance and exhibited a good quality 
of life. The Tanu Youth League had been established to recruit youth from all 
over the country. They established more than 500 small settlements. Such 
settlements were less capital-intensive and involved politically dedicated 
young people who devoted their time to productive efforts in their 
settlements. The causes of the eventual failure of many TYL settlements, 
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however, were mismanagement and misuse of funds (Dumont, 1969). 
In 1963, a successful spontaneous settlement was established by the 
Ruvuma Development Association. About 400 families from very poor areas 
scattered across the country moved into 17 new settlements. The guiding 
principles were communal farming and self-reliance. Each settlement elected 
its own manager and a management committee from among themselves. 
They cultivated a wide range of crops, raised cattle and established weaving 
and spinning, brick making, flour milling and timber production, and 
reinvested their savings in social services and transportation. After 1968, the 
Ruvuma Development Association was banned, allegedly for representing 
the elite (Dumont, 1969). 
There were two lessons learned by the government through their 
settlement experience. First, they accepted that nucleated settlement and 
broad extension of social services were the prerequisites for rural 
development and for checking the rural-urban drift of youths. This idea led 
to the formulation of the Ujamaa policy, which referred to living and 
working together in communities for the good of all. The second lesson was 
that capital was scarce and could not therefore form the basis for rural 
development; rather land and labor should be mobilized as the basis for 
socioeconomic development. The failure of the post-independence land 
settlements set the stage for nationwide planned settlements with wider 
objectives that encompassed more than increasing the production of cash 
crops (Maro, 1983). 
What is ujamaa? The concept of ujamaa means familyhood and is based 
on traditional African socialism. The underlying principles include respect 
for the rights and place of each member of the community by all members, 
and the obligation of each member to contribute to the development of the 
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community by working hard. Therefore ujamaa means living and working 
together in communities for the good of all. In order to work together, the 
people had to be brought together to live in ujamaa villages (Maro, 1983). 
Objectives of Ujamaa 
The objectives of Ujamaa settlements, couched in the philosophies of 
socialism and rural development, were laid out in the 1975 Villages and 
Ujamaa Villages Act, which specified the following: 
1. To build a society in which all members have equal rights and 
opportunities, and in which all members have a gradually increasing 
basic level of material welfare; 
2. To develop new socialist relations of production based on communal 
land utilization; 
3. To promote a spirit of self-reliance in social and economic activities 
such as building schools, hospitals, and social services. 
The objectives of Ujamaa villages had different interpretations by the 
peasants and by the government. The great majority of the settlers assumed 
that the ujamaa policy would enhance their autonomy, and they expected the 
promised good life to start immediately after they moved into villages. The 
officials, on the other hand, interpreted the revolutionary objectives as 
inviting the state to play a major role in transforming the rural areas. Many 
officials applied the bureaucratic and managerial strategy of command and 
control in the formation of Ujamaa villages. The command and control 
strategy sometimes discouraged peasants' voluntary initiative and 
compliance (Maro and Maro, 1982). 
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Implementation of Ujamaa 
The strategy used in the formation of Ujamaa villages was spelled out in 
the document entitled Socialism and Rural Development. A Ujamaa village 
was defined as a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free 
will to live together and work together. Such villages were to be established 
through education and persuasion and not by force. But in 1969, the 
president of the country issued a circular stating that incentives became 
important to make people move to Ujamaa villages. From 1973 to 1976 force 
was widely used for moving the rural population into Ujamaa villages. 
From the beginning the president proposed three stages: the initial stage, 
when the people moved so as to live together; the second stage, when the 
village community had gained some experience of living together and 
participating in communal activities; and the third stage, when the villagers 
could be persuaded to become communal farms with small plots and other 
communal productive activities (Ellman 1970, McHenry 1979). 
Structure of Ujamaa Villages 
The objectives and strategies evolved and consequently the concept of 
Ujamaa villages changed. Though villages formed before 1973 were referred 
to as Ujamaa villages, they did not have any communal activities. With 
governmental campaign to move people forcibly to villages, the new villages 
were referred to as development villages to distinguish them from earlier 
villages already in existence. In some regions of the country three types of 
village were recognized: the regular village, which had no cooperative or 
communal activities; the cooperative village, which had been registered as a 
cooperative; and the Ujamaa village, which carried on all its operations on a 
communal basis. The 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act recognized only 
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two kinds of villages: villages and Ujamaa villages. The criteria for being 
recognized as a Ujamaa villages as set forth by the Act included self-reliance 
and communal activities. Such villages were required to have constitutions 
and contain a minimum of 250 families in a defined area. They needed a 
village assembly consisting of all residents aged 18 and over and a village 
council of 25 members selected by the assembly. The Ujamaa village councils 
had to be capable of setting up committees to deal with finance, planning, 
production, marketing, education, and social welfare. Ujamaa villages 
needed a chairman and secretary. All land and major machinery and 
buildings were required to be under the control of the village council. When 
such criteria had been met, a village could apply for registration to become a 
Ujamaa village according to the 1975 Act. The Act stressed communal 
production, to provide a nationwide standard for living and working 
together. 
Formation of Ujamaa Villages and Population Redistribution 
In 1967 about 5 percent of the rural population in Tanzania lived in 
traditional villages, and the majority of the rural population lived in 
individual scattered homesteads. Therefore, to implement a successful 
ujamaa policy, most people had to move from where they lived to new 
villages. From 1967 to 1969, persuasion was used for making people move to 
new homes. Seminars, meetings, tours and campaigns were organized in 
different parts of the country to persuade leaders and rural peoples to 
establish the ujamaa policy. 
By 1969 there was a total of 800 Ujamaa villages throughout the country, 
with a total population of about 300,000 people, representing about 2 to 5 
percent of the rural population. The leadership was impatient with slow 
progress, and the promise that ujamaa villages would transform the rural 
areas was losing credibility. 
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Between 1970 and 1972, the government began to take a more active role 
in the formation of Ujamaa villages. While the government increased the 
incentive for people to move to villages, the 1970 famine struck some 
regions. The president took the personal initiative of living in such villages 
and participating in the activities of persuading and helping people to move 
into villages where they could participate in communal production. As a 
result of such participation, the number of villages in the Dodoma Region, 
where the president lived, increased from 75 in 1970 to 246 in 1971. Some 
regional commissioners did the same thing as the president. With 
intensified campaigns, the number of villages in the country increased to 
4,864; and by 1973 about 2 million people, representing 15.7 percent of the 
rural population were living in Ujamaa villages. 
POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION 
The population redistribution differed from one area to another. 
Between 1967 and 1973 it was estimated that only 1.5 million people were 
moved to new settlements. But between 1973 and 1976, not less than 5 
million people moved to new settlements. Although at the national level 
villagization involved massive changes in population distribution, at the 
local level, redistribution generally took place within each administrative 
region. By 1977, however, the rural population had been collectivized into 
nucleated land settlements. This was a considerable achievement and one 
that laid the foundation for rural transformation (Ellman 1970, Mushi 1971, 
McHenry 1979). 
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE SETILEMENTS 
Villagization eliminated landlessness in the rural population. The 
elimination of large individual landholdings, land speculation, and the 
government requirement that all able peasants must work contributed to the 
elimination of landlessness. The organization of production on both 
individual and communal farms increased work discipline among the 
peasants 
The size of the farms, both individual and communal, differed from one 
area to another, according to the physical environment and the type of 
agricultural inputs available to peasants. In general the individual holdings 
were 1.2 hectares as an average, but they could be as large as 5 hectares or 
more especially in livestock grazing areas. The size of communal farms per 
household was even smaller. In the years following villagization, especially 
1980-1981, agricultural production did not increase significantly. In fact, some 
export crops, such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco, actually declined. Several 
factors contributed to the decline in agricultural production: 
1. Low level of investment in agriculture; 
2. The low use of mechanization; 
3. Shortage of agricultural extension people; 
4. The inadequate marketing and the transportation, and; 
5. Shortage of pest control. 
Despite these factors, communal farms received official support and 
enjoyed modern inputs. Communal farms were used to demonstrate the 
advantages of mechanization, high-yield seeds, fertilizers, and appropriate 
planting. In some areas, application of these techniques proved that 
considerable increases in yields per hectare could be obtained (McCall 1985). 
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RURAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
As far as land settlements were concerned, the Tanzanian government 
made efforts to promote improved rural income. The nationalization of land 
in 1962 gave almost every Tanzanian equal rights to the use of land, while it 
also put an end to feudal systems. Since villagization, land allocation 
throughout the country were controlled by village authorities. This assured 
every peasant of at least subsistence farming and eliminated the basis for 
landlessness and extreme poverty. 
The Arusha Declaration, on which the ujamaa policy was based, 
emphasized equitable distribution of income and access to basic social 
services. The village became the basic center for free primary education, free 
primary health care, and clean water. The social services helped to reduce 
ignorance, disease, and poverty in the rural area. The government 
introduced farm import subsidies and eliminated export taxes. Produce 
prices, especially for food crops, increased steadily, contributing to increased 
farm incomes The government controlled prices and established wage, 
income, and price policy for achieving a degree of equity in income 
distribution in both rural and urban areas. 
VILLAGIZATION AND BASIC SERVICES 
After the Arusha Declaration, the government decided that apart from 
giving everyone access to productive opportunities, there was a need to 
provide free basic needs in the form of primary education, health, and clean 
water, for social justice and as a necessary input for socioeconomic 
development. The collectivization of the rural population into nucleated 
50 
settlements enabled the government to provide basic services to the 
maximum number of people at a minimum cost. Such basic services in 
Tanzania were very successful and very effective in improving the quality of 
life for the majority of Tanzanian people. 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LAND SETTLEMENTS 
There were two kinds of financial costs involved in land settlement: the 
costs of moving people to villages and the cost of providing them with their 
basic needs. The cost of moving 5 million people has been estimated at about 
800 million Tanzanian shillings, and the cost of providing people with their 
basic needs totalled 300 million shillings. This did not include the costs of 
social services and infrastructure. These costs were a large burden on the 
government. The greatest benefit of villagization was the provision of basic 
services, the availability of education, clean water, and health services, which 
led to a reduction in mortality and an increase in life expectancy. All this 
enabled the peasants to engage effectively in productive activities and to 
improve the quality of their lives. Though the cost to government was high, 
the establishment of the Ujamaa settlements were positive and apparently 
justified the costs (World Bank 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
The Arusha Declaration settlements that failed were abandoned because 
they were inappropriately conceived, overcapitalized, and relied on foreign 
funding. While the villagization program amounted to agrarian revolution, 
it was hardly possible to exaggerate its importance in shaping the economic, 
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social, and political future of Tanzania. There were over 15 million people 
living and working together in over 800 villages in rural Tanzania. In 1981, 
agriculture production contributed between 75 and 80 percent of foreign 
exchange. The Ujamaa village were important as the core of development 
and well-being for the entire population. The villages as a sociopolitical 
institutions were established and moving toward full achievement of the 
goals their establishment intended to achieve. Under their village 
governments, the villagers were engaged in the cultivation of individual 
plots and communal farms and in various cooperative productive activities. 
They were involved in the formulation and preparation of projects relevant 
to the development of the village. Villages were therefore firmly and 
permanently established in Tanzania and are presently making a significant 
contribution to socioeconomic development. 
With all the successes evidenced by villagization, several problems are 
now faced. The most pressing problem in all villages is that of low yields and 
low productivity in agriculture. Most of the villages suffer from the related 
problems of incompetent leadership, management, and technical skills. This 
calls for village-based training in government administration and 
management, such as bookkeeping, shop management, modern agriculture 
and animal husbandry. Villages may be much more understanding and 
accepting of fellow villagers trained in matters of local development rather 
than government agents of change who may not be sympathetic to village 
development problems. 
Other problems presently experienced by the villages come from the fact 
there has not been significant transformation in other sections of the national 
economy, especially industry. This has created serious problems in the supply 
of inputs, the collection and marketing of agricultural products, and the 
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development of infrastructure. The production of consumer goods by local 
industries was part of the incentive package to distribute goods more 
efficiently. However, most local industries have failed to produce essential 
consumer goods in the villages. 
CHAPTER VI 
LAND SETTLEMENT IN ETHIOPIA 
Ethiopia is the third most populous country in Africa, having nearly 35 
million people. In 1984 Ethiopia's total land area was 1.24 million square 
kilometers. With this large area, only 14.8 percent of the country's land area 
was under cultivation; 50 percent of the total area consisted of grazing land 
and browsing. Nearly 19 percent of the land was not utilizable for agriculture. 
There are three geographical areas in Ethiopia, classified according to 
altitude, temperature, rainfall and vegetation. The Kolla area, which is the 
land below the altitude of 1500 meters above sea level with high temperatures 
throughout the year (20° C. or higher) associated with low vegetation. 
Secondly, the Weynadega area, which consists of all lands of 1500-2500 meters 
above sea level, with medium temperatures and the agriculture in the area 
dependent on rain-fed crops. Thirdly, the Dega area, which consists of 
highlands with altitudes of 2500 meters and more above sea level with low 
temperatures throughout the year. 
Ethiopian settlement patterns follow these geographical divisions. Most 
of the farm people practice rain-fed agriculture, which are located in the Dega 
and Weynadega area. In the plateau area of Eritrea, Tegre and Wallo, 
nucleated settlements are common. Closely spaced huts characterize 
settlement patterns in parts of the Gondas, Gojam and Gamogofa plateau 
area. In the highland areas, scattered settlements and widely spaced groups of 
huts are typical patterns of settlement. In 1984 about 78 percent of the 
Ethiopian population lived in the Dega and Weynadega area because the 
highland areas had good volcanic soil, favorable temperatures and high 
rainfall. 
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The lowlands, as in the Kolla area, have a very low population. The 
Kolla area covers about 60 percent of Ethiopia's land area. It has harsh 
climatic conditions; high temperatures throughout the year, insufficient 
rainfall, low vegetation, and debilitating hazards such as malaria and the 
tsetse fly. It supports a mainly nomadic people, who accounted for nearly 10 
percent of the total population in 1984 (As-Faw 1975). 
The settlement patterns in Ethiopia are not well-balanced. 
Concentrations of large numbers of people in the highlands have put great 
environmental and economic pressure on the land. Land fragmentation 
resulted in low agricultural productivity and landlessness (Kassaye 1978). 
This bad situation was made even worse by the droughts in 1972-73. The 
droughts served as an impetus to focus public attention on relief aid for the 
survivors, while it also encouraged policy makers to think in terms of long-
term solutions, mostly concerning the resettlement of those for whom there 
was no hope of making a livelihood on the land that had been ravaged by 
drought. 
In 1941, after the expulsion of the Italian occupation forces, large tracts of 
land, particularly in the southern regions, were claimed as government land. 
These constituted the bases for settlement programs in Ethiopia. Emperor 
Haile Selassie distributed land to patriots, prewar soldiers, public servants, 
and some landless and unemployed people. The Emperor used his powers 
not only to grant government land as he wished but also to change the status 
of landholdings from one form to another. He made many authorizations 
for the conversion of temporary usage rights to land into freehold usages. 
Such powers by the Emperor to develop land administration did not always 
result in beneficial settlement patterns. 
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Political gains were given more consideration than long-term economic 
gains. Many grantees did not themselves settle on the land but kept title to it. 
Others used their ownership privileges to maintain tenants and gain profits. 
Often the beneficiaries of the grantee system were landowners. The system 
therefore had the effect of accentuating the inequality of incomes and giving 
more powers to landowners. The landlord-dominated parliament failed to 
develop any reform in agriculture, which remained backward and faced 
declining productivity. These conditions were not isolated only in the 
Ethiopian monarchy. Unfortunately they were a duplication of the 
con<:fitions in Iraq during the King's reign after it had gained its independence 
from the English colonial forces following World War IT. 
In 1966 the Ministry of Land Reform was established, charged with the 
task of formulating appropriate land reform policies. Among its priorities 
was the adoption and implementation of settlement and resettlement 
programs. The government attached great significance to the settlement 
issue, both to solve the problems of a too-high labor to land ratio in the 
northern plateau regions and modernizing agriculture and increasing 
productivity and the economy as a whole. In 1971 a consultant advisory 
group from Harvard suggested repeal of the land grant system in Ethiopia and 
proposed a comprehensive planned utilization of government lands through 
sound and appropriate settlement policies. 
Another problem identified by the advisory group report of was 
excessive spontaneous settlement. This coincided with earlier studies by the 
planning commission which concluded that spontaneous and unorganized 
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settlements were not a very good means of improving agriculture 
production. The Ministry of Land Reform and Administration saw 
settlements as an important development strategy. Soil studies by the 
ministry found government land that could be used for settlement was rather 
limited. Large areas of the land were located in arid regions with very small 
prospects of irrigated agriculture. Other areas were located in remote regions, 
covered with forest and swampy land, which could be very costly to develop. 
However, the government was overthrown in 1974, before any working land 
policy and program could be implemented. 
There are two types of settlements in Ethiopia; spontaneous and planned 
Spontaneous settlements started in 1942 by movements of very large 
numbers of people. A number of factors precipitated the development of 
spontaneous settlements. These included (1) high rates of population 
increase throughout Ethiopia, including the northern plateau, which already 
had high population densities; (2) little opportunity for landownership in the 
northern region of the country; (3) large scale evictions of tenants from the 
land in the central region as a result of commercialization and 
mechanization; and (4) improvements in transportation and communication 
and the government's land grant system, by which large numbers of grantees 
were encouraged to settle in new areas. A study carried out in 1975 by Wood 
observed that spontaneous resettlement had become widespread in Ethiopia 
during the prior three decades. 
Planned settlements in Ethiopia started after the overthrow of the 
monarchy government in 1974. However, there were three five-year 
development plans, the first of which (1957-61) did no more than mention 
the need to use settlement programs to improve agricultural productivity. 
The second five-year development plan (1963-67) did not produce any new 
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development in the planned settlement, but it was recommended that studies 
be conducted to pave the way for an effective land settlement program in 
future years. In the third five-year development plan (1968-73), settlements 
were viewed as a regional development strategy to relieve population 
pressures in the northern plateau regions, increase agricultural productivity 
through the use of underdeveloped land resources, and improve land 
management practices. This was the general picture at the national level. 
At the local level the first known planned settlement was started in 1958 
by the governor of the Sidamo region. The purpose was to bring under 
cultivation lowland areas that were only in marginal use. A further aim of 
the settlements was to resettle surplus people from the overcrowded 
highlands, Welamo and other similar areas. These settlements were later 
passed on to the Welamo agricultural development unit when it was 
established in 1970 under the Ministry of Agriculture to implement a regional 
development program. Several other settlements followed these sponsored 
ones. These early settlements were conceived as low cost, labor intensive 
projects in which government inputs were kept to a minimum. There was 
careful selection of the settlers, and there was provision of a demonstration 
program as part of the agricultural extension service (Wetterhall 1972). 
A real change in increased planned settlements took place with the 
establishment in 1974 of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, a direct 
consequence of the 1972-73 famine that claimed many thousands of lives. 
A significant event in facilitating the process of settlement was the 1975 
Proclamation, which nationalized rural land. The public ownership of rural 
lands made it possible for the government to resettle people as needed. In 
addition, it cleared the way for setting up peasant associations. The other 
important development was the establishment of settlement authority in 
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1978 as a unit within the Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement (Simpson 
1975). 
The priorities of such authority were the settlement of unemployed 
people, displaced groups, landless persons, and nomads. According to its 
planned programs, the settlement authority was to provide settlers with 
agricultural inputs on a credit basis, loans for setting up cooperative 
organizations, a water supply, health care, and education. The cooperative 
organizations, which were part of the scheme for achieving self-reliance, were 
to be owned and managed by the settlers themselves. The settlement 
authority set a target of settling 20,000 families per year. Actual settlement 
was less than expected, constrained by developments that led to further 
reorganization of the settlement programs. The Proclamation of 1979 set up a 
new Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. This commission was to bring 
under one organization the tasks that had been carried out by three different 
agencies, namely the Awash Valley Authority, the Settlement Authority, and 
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. It was a body accountable to the 
office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and was given wide-
ranging powers and duties in the settlement program. As of 1983, there were 
85 planned settlements. 
OB~CT~SOFPLANNEDSETILEMENT 
There were many objectives of planned settlement to be achieved: to 
make use of and develop idle land and water resources; to provide income 
and activity to unemployed people and peasants suffering from the drought; 
to accommodate landless farmers in settlements; to shift people from 
overcrowded areas to better settlements; and additionally, to settle the 
nomadic tribes. In general the settlement programs were directed at three 
target groups: First, the urban unemployed groups of people of working age 
and in need of productive jobs. As in most third world countries, the 
problem of urban unemployment in Ethiopia was in the alarming range 
between 10 and 20 percent. The second target group consisted of those who 
had been displaced due to drought. These were inhabitants of the highland 
regions of Ethiopia where the soil had been depleted of its fertility due to 
mismanagement, poor soil use practices, and recurrent drought. This target 
group included thousands of families without any resources for their 
livelihood. 
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The third target group encompassed the nomadic people. They made up 
about 10 percent of the total population of Ethiopia. The earliest planned 
settlements for the nomadic people were in the Awash Valley under the old 
Awash Valley Authority. However, a better concerted effort to settle nomads 
was made by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in 1983, which settled 
some 7000 nomads in 15 settlements. These numbers made up about 21 
percent of all settlers and 18 percent of all settlements in Ethiopia. The 
reasons for such planned settlement by the Ethiopian government were 
recurrent drought and dislocations. 
The Settlement Process 
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission started with the 
identification and selection of target groups. Then the Commission made 
each target group understand the advantages of involvement in a settlement 
program. The type of group the Commission looked for was a family 
belonging to the 18 to 45 age group, in good health, and a willingness to live 
by the Commission rules. Once heads of families registered, a feasibility study 
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of the selected settlement site was conducted. This included a study of its 
location, climate, geology, soils, topography, vegetation, water resources, 
communications, and land use. The study was carried out by a team 
comprised of an agronomist, agricultural engineer, agricultural economist, 
geographer, animal husbandry specialist, and sociologist. The study included 
development of a general plan on how and when the various important 
targets were to be realized. A detailed plan was established that set up a work 
schedule for every operation, including necessary material, financial, and 
manpower requirements for the fulfillment of the operation. The planning 
stage of the program was then completed and the implementation started. 
The final stage involved assessing the program and making modifications 
throughout implementation. 
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission was given the task of settler 
selection. The Ministries of Agriculture, Interior, and Labor and Social 
Affairs, as well as the peasants' associations, were expected to participate in 
recruitment of people for resettlement. In principle, no one was chosen for a 
settlement program unless he/she volunteered for it. 
The Settlement Model 
The scheme of the Ethiopian settlement model set forth an objective that 
each settlement unit be composed of 500 families. Five such units made one 
project area with an office of administration and management to coordinate 
its activities. The first settlers were accommodated in common shelters; later 
they constructed their own dwellings. Each settler was given one 1000 square 
meter plot on which to construct his homestead. The settlers were provided 
with food, clothing, and other essentials until they attained self-sufficiency. 
Self-sufficiency in food was expected to be attained after only two 
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seasons. However, in instances where this was not attained, governmental 
food aid covered the difference between actual production and food 
requirements. Expenses incurred for livestock development were expected to 
be repaid. However, money expended on investments for development 
works, including building for livestock development, did not require 
repayment. 
Settlers were organized into producer cooperatives. Within the first year 
it was anticipated that the settlers would be introduced to the basic principles 
of cooperative farming. The leaders of the cooperatives would be given some 
education in cooperative management, job assignment, and income 
allocation. 
Each settlement was expected to have a unit manager, a cooperative 
organizer, an economist, a mechanic, and an assistant administrator. In total, 
14 skilled persons were assigned by the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission. Over a three-year period, settlers were given training in the 
field of agriculture, cooperative management, health, and economics. A 
settlement project was expected to achieve self-sufficiency in three years. At 
the end of the third year, a team of experts from the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture would determine whether self-
sufficiency had been attained. If the conclusion was positive, the Ministry of 
Agriculture would take over administrative control; if not, the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission would run the project for a few more years. 
THE SETTLEMENTS SCHEME ACHIEVEMENTS 
About 95 percent of Ethiopian settlements were run by the government. 
The land allocated for settlements was considered choice land with enough 
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moisture and good soil conditions. The government therefore expected the 
settlement schemes to yield high levels of land and labor productivity. 
Actual performance has been far below expectations (Wood 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
Ethiopia, like many other Third World countries, has a population that 
is unevenly distributed. For example, the high plateau area has high 
population densities, with depleted soil and very poor environment, while 
the lowlands area, which has a great potential for irrigated agriculture, is 
underpopulated. One of the planned settlement policies was to take a 
measure of population relocation, and the second objective was to make 
better use of land and water resources. 
The settlement of nomads, a reduction in urban unemployment, and the 
development of agriculture for cash crop production including exports, were 
too costly. The settlement program faced serious problems, such as 
mismanagement and low land and labor productivity. The lack of sufficient 
time to prepare, plan, and implement settlement programs was a cause of 
high costs. This situation was expected to improve if political stability 
increased and the conditions of drought improved. 
The alternative settlement model has its own advantages, which show 
that low-cost settlements are in general terms more cost effective and more 
efficient than special settlement schemes. Therefore, it is essential to make 
the low-cost settlement option a viable proposition in future settlement 
programs. 
Settlement costs must be brought down to the cost levels of producers, 
cooperatives and other different competing forms of agricultural production 
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units. Among such cost-reducing steps, careful selection of settlement lands 
and settlers, and least-cost execution of settlement schemes may prove 
beneficial. The introduction of incentives, the provision of inputs and 
training, and the guarantee of good prices for all settlement products may also 
contribute to the success of settlements. 
There are many other measures that could contribute to lowering the 
cost of settlements, such as good services, favorable marketing, and improved 
transportation. All these together, with improved management of 
settlements may lower their costs of operation. Under the present practice, 
settlers are made totally dependent on the government, which provides free 
food, transportation, equipment, training and other services. This in part is 
responsible for the high cost of settlements. An alternative scheme of 
settlement might be considered such as voluntary settlements, and a 
partnership between settlers and the government in sharing costs and other 
responsibilities. 
CHAPTER Vll 
RESE'ITLEMENT OF NOMADS IN SOMALIA 
Geographically, Somalia is a land of rolling savannah with high areas in 
the north located east of Ethiopia on the Gulf of Aden. It has two rivers, both 
coming from the Ethiopian highland. The land between those rivers is very 
fertile and the most well irrigated in the country. Generally, Somalia is 
considered arid or semiarid; low rainfall and droughts are common. 
Somalia has a population around 6 million in 1970. About two-thirds 
were nomads in an area about 637 to 657 square kilometers. The 1974 drought 
caused large migrations of nomadic people from the rural areas to the cities in 
search of water and food (Mohamed 1977). In 1975 the government 
established about 20 relief camps. The total population of these camps was 
estimated around 300,000 people. During the desperate period of the drought 
an estimated 20,000 people, mostly children and elderly, died. Furthermore, 
the drought killed half of Somalia's nomadic sheep and goats, a third of its 
cattle and about 120,000 tons of food grain. 
When the seasonal rains returned, most drought-stricken nomads 
returned to the rural areas to rebuild their lives and herds. The Somalia 
government decided to resettle those who remained in permanent 
agricultural and fishing settlements. About 15,000 settled in three fishing 
settlements and about 105,000 settled in three agricultural settlements. 
Establishing permanent settlements for a large number of settlers exceeding 
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100,000 people was a very hard task. Because of the complex nature of the job, 
the government decided to create two independent agencies to be in charge of 
the development of the settlements. Thus in 1976, the Settlement 
Development Agency and the Coastal Development Project was created. 
In the period from 1975 to 1977, the settlements were run as extensions 
of the relief camps. The new agencies decided to upgrade the services such as 
medical facilities, building schools, digging wells, building food storage, and 
creating administrative centers to change the camp's character. Land clearing 
started immediately and crop cultivation started at the agricultural 
settlements before the end of 1975. The period was one of crucial 
readjustment for the nomadic settlers, as well as for the new agencies. 
However, many settlers left and returned to their herds and pasture lands. 
The settlements as a whole lost about 40 percent of their population. In 1976, 
the arrival of modern boats and the construction of permanent housing and 
processing facilities was the cornerstone to stabilize this drift at the fishing 
settlements. 
THE RESETTLEMENT POUCY 
The main objective of the resettlement policy evolved since 1974. 
However, the international aid to Somalia in response to the drought focused 
closely on two important issues. First, to redistribute Somalia population to 
avoid and reduce the rangeland deterioration, and reduce urban growth by 
developing productive rural enterprises. Through developing large scale 
irrigation projects and coastal and deep sea fishing schemes, the government 
hoped to diversify the country's economy in order to achieve national self-
sufficiency and reduce the country's trade deficit. Second, to provide social 
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services to a large number of nomadic population, and to deal with Somalia 
war refugees. 
The Nomad Resettlement 
The Somalia government established six nomad settlements, three of 
which were fishing settlements. These were Eil, Adale, and Brava. The first 
two fishing settlements were located north of Mogadishu and the third south 
of Mogadishu. The three agricultural settlements, Dujuma, Kurtunwary, and 
Sablaale, are south of Mogadishu. The agricultural settlements were much 
larger than the fishing settlements; the former had 17,000 to 25,000 settlers, 
while the fishing settlements had 3,000 to 5,000 settlers. 
Organization of the Settlements 
The organization was established at three levels: the Settlement 
Development Agency and the Coastal Development Project (their 
headquarters were at Mogadishu); the settlement management organization; 
and a sociopolitical structure within the overall framework of the provincial 
administration. 
Each settlement had its own management headed by a manager who was 
responsible for day-to-day operations. He was supported by a team of 
professional officers heading the departments of agriculture, livestock 
production, forestry, and farm administration. Because of the nomadic origin 
of the settlers, a high level of supervision was very essential; that was why 
junior staff supporting the senior management were needed. 
Settler Characteristics and Training 
Since 1975 resettlement meant a change in occupation for nomadic 
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people who had been drought-affected. A considerable training effort by the 
agencies administering the resettlement was required and essential. The 
Settlement Development Agency undertook an extensive training program. 
While awaiting the arrival of mechanized machinery and equipment, the 
Coastal Development Project concentrated its training on the use of modern 
boats. 
Training on both types of settlements was necessary to provide the 
settlements with engine operators, mechanics and net menders. In addition, 
processing workers and administrative workers were important for a 
settlement's survival. The training provided by the Settlement Development 
Agency included an adult literacy program for those who had no formal 
schooling. Skills training was also provided in agriculture, construction, 
handicrafts, clerical work, transport, communications, and health care. 
Income and Work Incentives in the Settlements 
At the inception of the settlements the government was providing all 
services and facilities, such as food, clothing, and housing. Most settlers in 
agricultural settlements received their rations and a small daily cash 
incentive per day of about 2 shillings. Such incentive were tied to the work 
done. Those given skills training received more, about 10 shillings per day, 
according to the skill acquired and their occupation. Fishermen in the fishing 
settlements received a cash incentive on a standard 0.80 shilling per kilogram 
of fish caught. 
The work attitudes of the settlers had serious implications for the 
planned self-sufficiency of the settlements. Throughout the settlements, 
absenteeism was very high and productivity low. Such conditions became a 
matter of concern; various alternative ways of encouraging productivity were 
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considered. One possibility was to increase cash payments, but the 
government could not afford such an increase. Another alternative was to 
create cooperatives and turn the settlements over entirely to the settlers, but 
the drawback of such an alternative was the question of whether former 
nomads could handle such responsibility with any hope of success. 
The most promising possibility was to provide input, extensions, and 
marketing services, while the household was to be responsible for generating 
its own income and responsible for bearing the cost of the services provided 
by the agency. 
ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
In general terms, the progress achieved in providing facilities and social 
services in the three agricultural settlements was impressive. In the fishing 
settlements, it was even more advanced. 
The housing projects at the agricultural settlements proved 
controversial. Many officials argued that housing would be better provided 
by the settlers themselves, and the settlement agencies' first priority should be 
to make the settlements economically viable. The argument was that when 
incomes in the settlement increase, the settlers themselves would build their 
own housing. While the housing projects were certainly an attraction that 
might have served the government's goals to retain the former nomads in 
the settlements, only the promise of a higher income could ensure the 
settlers' commitment to the project. 
Education and health care at the settlements appeared to be above the 
national norm. Healthwise, care also appeared to be more than adequate in 
the agricultural settlements, because each settlement had a lower ratio of 
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persons per dispensary than the national average, while the fishing 
settlements had access to the medical facilities at their nearby towns. 
The Somali government had some reservations about food rationing 
supplied by the government, the European Economic Community, and 
World Food Program. There was speculation that the short-term effects of 
providing free rations as well as housing would be a loss of incentive for the 
resettled people to work hard. The long-term effect may have been too much 
dependency on the state assistance. That is why the rations were phased out 
at the end of 1984. 
Population Redistribution 
The population redistribution in Somalia was an important issue for the 
future of the country. That was why the agricultural sector was required to 
carry the brunt of any major population redistribution. The government was 
placing greater emphasis on large scale irrigation projects run as state farms 
rather than replicating the Settlement Development Agency schemes, which 
in terms of production incentives appeared to be moving away from the state 
farm model. 
The World Bank Review suggested the agricultural sector could absorb 
population increases for the 20 years from 1980 to 2000 based on estimates that 
85,000 hectares of irrigated land would be developed and another 750,000 
hectares of land would be added to the rain-fed agricultural land. If the 
agricultural projects are completed, Somalia could well meet and even go 
beyond the World Bank target (World Bank 1983). 
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CONCLUSION 
While Somalia has great potential for fishing and agricultural resources, 
its rangelands are rapidly becoming overpopulated and overgrazed. This 
surplus population must be distributed to other areas of the country. The 
1974 drought dramatically increased the overstocking and mismanagement of 
the rangelands. Unfortunately, the subsequent range management and 
nomad resettlement programs have been less than successful in slowing the 
deterioration of the rangelands. 
In 1979-80, the drought and war arrived at the same time. That meant a 
considerable additional burden of livestock and human refugees for the 
rangelands to support. The urgency of relieving the pressure on Somalia's 
rangeland is greater than ever, and the Settlement Development Agency and 
the Coastal Development Project resettlement programs are the only 
experience the Somalia government has in attempting to redistribute the 
population to achieve better use of resources and manpower. 
Unfortunately, the Settlement Development Agency and Coastal 
Development Project have not been economically effective for many reasons: 
1. There was little comprehensive planning; 
2. Inadequate management; 
3. Social services and housing were very expensive and not cost 
effective; 
4. Little incentive for production. 
In general, a lack of policy and planning remains as one of the foremost 
obstacles. As with the range management projects, and with Somalia 
development efforts, project implementation and evaluation have continued 
to be adversely affected by the lack of working documents, such as reporting 
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and recording. This condition and difficulty has made it impossible to define 
development stages and strategies for long-range planning to meet ultimate 
objectives. 
From a social point of view rather than a narrow economic view, the 
overall performance of the settlement might not be unreasonable. This is 
especially true if the nonquantifiable benefits of the schemes are taken into 
account. The resettlement and creation of employment opportunities for 
many nomadic families. Creation of a social infrastructure that has improved 
hygiene, nutrition and education opportunities for such people as well as 
helping them to acquire agricultural and fishing skills they did not previously 
possess. These suggests that planning is crucial to the success of future 
resettlement programs. 
CHAPTER Vill 
LAND SETTLEMENT IN MALAYSIA 
The Malaysian program of land settlement started in the mid-1950's as a 
basic strategy for improvement of the economic status of the rural poor 
(Bahrin, Perea, and Lim 1977). Within about 30 years, the program received 
worldwide attention for its style of implementation and overall performance, 
in which large tracts of land were developed and occupied by previously poor 
and landless farmers. Farmers who settled in the large tracts of land became 
possessed of relatively good income, compared with those who remained in 
the old villages. 
The Malaysian resettlement program differed somewhat from other 
Southeast Asian programs. It was not intended as a population redistribution 
measure, but was essentially aimed at improving the socioeconomic status of 
the participants. Nor was it implemented as part of a more comprehensive 
rural reform. The program schemes generally used land for growing cash 
crops, especially rubber and palm oil, rather than subsistence food crops. The 
manner of implementation also differed somewhat from other programs. 
The Malaysian settlers Wfxe not required to engag"e in jungle clearing, thus 
making the projects relatively more capital intensive. 
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The land ownership in Malaysia was under the ruler-in-council, and any 
issue of land titles for such lands had to be conducted through the ruler. 
However, demand for land was very great on its Moxeman Height. At the 
time of independence, August 1957, there were some 200,000 land 
applications awaiting action. 
A Committee was set up by the government for action. Action included 
processing land transfers and making recommendations for improvements 
and developments. The Committee report observed that the scheme of land 
transfer in Malaysia was commonly causing much work, confusion, taking a 
great deal of time, costing a lot of money and producing the poorest economic 
results for the individuals concerned and for the community as a whole. One 
of the causes of this situation was the initiation of land applications by 
individuals rather than by organizations or agencies that could be expected to 
have a better understanding or to have an overall view of the selected area. 
Almost every application was made for personal gain, without the least 
regard for public interest. Under these conditions, applicants who had money 
and knowledge about application procedures were in a more favorable 
position to obtain land than those who really needed it. 
Under the system, land development initiated by the applicants and not 
by the administration was not the action desired by the Committee. The 
Committee was of the opinion that land ownership transfer should be 
initiated by the State to avoid haphazard settlement. It was recommended 
that areas of land suitable for development should be identified and an initial 
appraisal of the area for its economic viability made before dividing it into 
suitable units. It was also thought that in appraising each parcel of land 
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before receiving any application, it would be proper to include provision of 
basic amenities such as roads, schools, health services, water and other 
facilities. An approach of this kind indicated a system of planned settlements. 
The Malaysian government set up a working party early in 1955. The 
working party emphasized the need for land resources to be assessed. Large 
areas for new development would be allocated only after being planned. The 
working party recommended an emphasis on the need for planned and 
coordinated development of land to insure that economic development 
proceeded in accordance to social development goals. The working party also 
suggested that development activities be coordinated and controlled to insure 
that division of holding does not occur, and that the settlers have an adequate 
amount of land and a good standard of living. 
The Committee members also recommended that an organization be 
created to implement the development program. They suggested that a 
federal authority with powers of financing and carrying out individual 
projects would be too remote from the state and the people who were to be 
assisted. It therefore suggested that the organization for providing federal 
assistance for land development schemes be decentralized Local 
development authorities, set up by the ruler-in-council for each project, 
would be responsible for the planning and execution of the projects. The 
Federal Land Development Authority was to be involved only when a local 
authority had decided to carry out a project. 
Such a system had some weaknesses, for example, too slow a pace in 
opening new projects during the initial period. In view of the slow pace and 
limited achievements by the Federal Land Development Authority, the 
Malaysian government set up a committee in 1960 to investigate the reason 
for the lack of success and to review the role of the Federal Land 
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Development Authority. The committee gave some reasons for the limited 
success: 
1 The lack of a sense of urgency in land development matters on the 
part of several state governments and their consequent slow response in 
proposing schemes. 
2. The lack of basic land use surveys and consequent absence of plans for 
land development. 
3. The lack of access to potential development areas. 
4. A shortage of qualified and experienced staff to supervise and manage 
land development schemes. (Tunku Shansul Bahrin 1968, 1977). 
The committee felt that to meet the increased demand for the proposed land 
development fifteen different agencies for land development projects, 
including Federal Land Development Authority, which was the largest, had 
to be employed. 
It is essential to understand fully the process of land settlement in 
Malaysia. It is essential to discuss the other types of land development 
schemes planned and implemented during the 1960's, namely, the group 
land settlement and the fringe land ownerships. 
GROUPSETILEMENTSCHEMES 
The group settlements were small sized settlements financed and 
implemented by the state governments. They came into being with the 
implementation of the Settlement Acts of 1961. 
The group settlement had some flaws. First, the settlements were in 
remote locations because it was hard to find a 2000-hectare area near towns 
and villages. Second, there were no subsistence allowances. The settlers were 
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forced to find alternative sources of income outside the settlements. As a 
result, the settlers were unable to carry out full-time work on their holdings. 
Third, because of the shortage of housing facilities, the settlers tended to live 
on their holdings rather than in the prescribed village area. This made it 
difficult for supervision. Finally, the area held by each settler was too large 
for the average family to develop, and the tasks became more difficult 
without any financial assistance from the state. Because of all these 
difficulties and weaknesses, all states quickly abandoned group settlement 
projects. 
FRINGE SCHEMES 
Fringe schemes were implemented by the state governments but 
financed by federal grants and loans. The idea behind these projects was to 
supplement existing holdings that were economically unsound. They were 
therefore established near agricultural settlements. 
The fringe schemes intended that the participants were to be farmers 
who already owned holdings that were not economically profitable. Those 
holdings considered uneconomic were ones less than 3.6 hectares in area. As 
the projects were for people already in possession of some agricultural land, 
they were expected to work on the projects on a part-time basis while 
continuing to farm their own holdings. The Malaysian government decided 
to allocate 49,560,000 (M$) as a federal subsidy for the establishment of such 
projects for the period 1960-70. The money was to be provided in the form of 
loans and grants to cover the costs of clearing land. The loans were not to 
exceed (M$) 815 per hectare to meet the cost of specified items, and interest 
was to be charged at a rate not exceeding So/o per year, over a period of six 
years. In addition to the loan, a grant was to be made by the federal 
government of about (M$) 647 per hectare to cover the costs of material and 
fertilizers. 
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By the end of 1970,423 projects had been established, covering an area of 
64,660 hectares with 26,104 participating families (Tunku Bahrin 1976). The 
overall performance of these projects can be generally described as 
disappointing. The federal government was so dissatisfied with the projects 
that it had to create a new federal authority (the Federal Land Consolidation 
and Rehabilitation Authority), with the major function of helping and 
redeveloping those failed projects. 
IMPLEMENTATION AND SETILER SELECTION 
Since 1950 the government had been aware that settlers were the most 
important factor in implementation and determining the success or failure of 
its programs. The Federal Land Development Authority tried a number of 
selection systems to insure that it obtained the right type of settlers. For 28 
years the Authority has instituted a number of changes in its selection system, 
however, according to its formalized selection system, prospective 
participants had to submit their applications on prescribed forms and meet 
these requirements: 
1. Malaysian citizens; 
2. Aged 21-50 years; 
3. Married, preferably with children; 
4. Landless or with rural holding of less than 0.8 hectares; 
5. From an agricultural background, and; 
6. Physically fit. 
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Applicants who met the requirements were first interviewed, then accepted 
on a points system. The most points were awarded to those who were 
landless, with large numbers of dependents. The maximum score was 100, 
and any applicant obtaining a score of less than 50 points was disqualified. 
Development of Land 
Malaysia had considerable land available for development, but the 
choices of land for settlement was not simple and easy. Almost all land that 
was suitable for agricultural development and in close proximity to 
transportation and other communication had already been utilized. The state 
governments owned most unoccupied land. The Federal Land Development 
Authority had to negotiate with state governments to secure release of any 
land for settlement. When agreement had been reached with respect to 
location, suitable crops, and survey fees, the state government declared the 
land a development area. Once declared a development area, the land was 
then turned to the Federal Land Development Authority. Most settlement 
sizes per project were 1800 hectares for 400 families. The size of holding per 
settler family on the other hand was governed by income and employment 
factors. Each settler family was given 4 hectares of agricultural land and a 
piece of residential lot about 0.1 hectares in size. 
Pattern of Settlement Development 
The pattern of pre-1966 development under the Federal Land 
Development Authority scheme for settler families occurred in different 
phases. The first year was devoted to the felling and clearing of trees for the 
establishment of an approximate 300 acre (120 hectare) village area and the 
planting of about 1000 acres (400 hectares) of the main crop. Land remaining 
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for the main crop was developed in subsequent annual stages of 
approximately 1000 to 1500 acres (400-600 hectares). The subsidiary crop areas 
were developed at a later period, as decided by the Federal Land Development 
Authority, subject to the progress made in the development of land for the 
main crop. This pattern was known as phased development. Since 1966, this 
pattern has changed over to the development of larger areas. 
The government's desire to speed land development made it imperative 
that larger areas for agricultural development be made available. The 
emphasis on palm oil also made the development of larger areas desirable in 
order to realize the economic benefits of such scale. In the past, logging delays 
had prevented the land from becoming rapidly available. But increasing 
demand for tropical timbers and increased logging and clearing rates made it 
easier to obtain larger areas. With an increase in management, it was possible 
to develop larger areas. 
LAND DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVEMENTS 
The Federal Land Development Authority in Malaysia was considered 
the most important agency in the field of land settlement. This was clearly 
recognized by the government, as seen by the land allotted for development. 
By the end of 1982, the agency had implemented 331 projects comprising a 
total of 1,383,528 acres (559,906 hectares) of agricultural land and 93,527 acres 
(37,850 hectares) of urban and residential land. Palm oil and rubber were the 
major crops, occupying some 60.6 and 29.3 percent of the total agricultural 
area, respectively. 
The Federal Land Development Authority made a number of significant 
contributions to the development and diversification of agriculture in 
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Malaysia. The area developed and maintained by the agency made up 12 
percent of Malaysia's cultivated land. Although it helped to create 
communities and prosperous small scale rubber producers, the expansion in 
the cultivation of palm oil is considered one of the Authority's greatest 
contributions. By the end of 1982, the agency had relocated 43,978 settlers on 
its palm oil projects, producing 4,734,605 tons of palm oil, representing about 
30 percent of Malaysia's total production. This most significant contribution 
successfully showed that traditional farmers could be turned into modern 
agriculturalists if given the right guidance and opportunities (Chan 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Malaysia developed a satisfactory land settlement program. During the 
30 years since its inception in the mid-1950's, the settlement program became 
a significant tool for the economic development of Malaysia. In addition, the 
programs attracted a great deal of attention from many countries who were 
involved in similar programs. This does not mean that their program was 
perfect or solved all the difficulties of the rural areas of the country. The 
Federal Land Development Authority by the end of 1982 had been able to 
resettle only about 76,782 families and develop 599,900 hectares; many more 
applications were waiting to be processed and new demands and challenges 
emerged, awaiting solutions. 
Overall, it would be reasonable to conclude that the land development 
program in Malaysia, as planned and implemented, achieved the objectives 




LAND SETILEMENTS IN THE PI-ITLIPPINES 
The Philippines have experienced extended periods of resettlement, 
almost more than any other country in Southeast Asia, including both 
government sponsored and spontaneous settlements. However, the 
resettlement schemes in the Philippines may be reviewed in three stages: the 
colonial period of Spanish rule, which developed a tradition of agricultural 
production oriented toward export crops; second, an American colonial 
period; and third, a period of settlement during the independence period 
(1946-60) (Paderanga and Pemia 1983). 
SETILEMENT POLICY IDSTORY 
The American policy during the colonial period had three major goals. 
First, integrate the Philippine economy into the U.S. market. That was done 
by lowering the barriers to trade between the two countries. The second aim 
was an attempt to rationalize land ownership. The mixture of the remnants 
of the Spanish system with a different method of land management and 
registration under the United States led to friction between landowners and 
tenants, which caused conflicting claims to ownership of land. The United 
States issued new laws regulating the possession and ownership of land. 
These laws provided for the disposition of public land and introduced the 
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homestead concept. The third objective of the U.S. government was a 
conciliatory policy toward and amalgamation of the non-Christian 
population, especially in the south. This approach was pursued to encourage 
people from the north and central parts to settle in the frontier regions. 
Direct government involvement in settlement programs started when it 
adopted a policy of actively encouraging migration in 1913. It established 
agricultural settlements that offered free transportation and financial 
assistance. From 1913 to 1917, nine such settlements were established, 
covering in area about 12,760 hectares. Government policy makers sought to 
encourage homesteaders to migrate from congested areas into the interior 
and southern parts of the Mindonao area. They hoped it would lead to 
integration and Pilippinization of different ethnic groups in these areas. 
These settlements were in general unsuccessful, because of a lack of funds, ill-
chosen sites, and unwise selections of settlers. 
In 1917, the government, discouraged by the high costs and lack of 
success, retreated from its policy of sponsored settlements. The program was 
replaced by one that merely encouraged the movement of migrants who 
could support themselves for at least six months in the settlement area. 
Apart from transportation and guidance regarding the final destination, no 
support was offered. Up to 1935 the quantitative impact of these early 
programs was very small (SimKins and Wernstadt 1968). 
The period of 1935 to 1946 was one in which the established 
Commonwealth government maintained the policy of encouraging 
settlements in thinly populated areas. Because of past mistakes, they 
concentrated on building up infrastructural support in the target areas, such 
as the frontier regions. Funds originally allotted for direct expenditure on 
agricultural settlements were diverted to road construction and land survey. 
83 
In the same time period, the government passed the Commonwealth Act, 
which established the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA). 
Under the NLSA many families moved to settlement areas at their own 
expense. The administration found it was difficult to tum back these 
families, which led to a rapid growth of population in the southern frontier, 
especially in Mindanao. 
The third period of settlement, during the independence, exhibited a 
different set of priorities (Pelzer 1946). Whereas colonial policy dictated close 
integration between the Filipino government and the United States, political 
autonomy in the Philippines decreed the economy of the country should 
stand on its own as much as possible. For the Philippines, this implied that a 
larger proportion of the industrial products it consumed would have to be 
generated from within. The unifying aim was industrialization, with import 
substitution as the main strategy to be followed. The policies used to 
implement this strategy were exchange and import controls. Rather than 
adjusting the overvalued peso, policy makers regarded it as an instrument to 
direct capital funds to preferred industries at subsidized rates. To maintain 
the official rate, the use of foreign exchange had to be controlled and a system 
of priorities instituted. Import substitution industries such as textile and 
appliance manufacturing were favored. 
Tax incentives and a comprehensive restructuring of tariffs were also 
used to achieve the overall objective. The final policy of the period was to 
raise the minimum wage; its unintended result was to discourage labor-
intensive industries and further bias investment toward capital-intensive 
import substitution industries. It was very sad that among these policies was 
a very strong disincentive to the agricultural sector. The overvalued peso, 
together with the bias of foreign exchange and controls toward import 
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substitution, effectively penalized the export-oriented agricultural cash crops 
on which the growth of the agricultural sector had been based before 
independence. At the same time, the ability of the agricultural sector to shift 
forcefully to the production of food for the domestic market was effectively 
blocked by the bias against the sector contained in the selective credit 
instruments, and the policy of subsidized importation of some commodities 
including food products, aimed at lowering food prices in the urban centers. 
Biased production techniques hardly changed for many years. Until 1960 
almost all agricultural growth came not from increased productivity but from 
increases in the area of the land under cultivation. Such increase was 
possible only because of the intensification of frontier region settlement. 
World War IT interrupted the settlem,ent activities of the government, but 
they resumed soon after, especially in the frontier area, when the applications 
increased sharply immediately after liberation as new migrants squatted on 
former Japanese plantations. In 1971 the Law of Agrarian Land Reform Code 
was amended, outlawing share tenancies and regulating land ownership and 
agrarian relations. This law created the land resettlement program as part of 
the general program of land reform (Renaud 1981). In 1983, the Bureau of 
Resettlement of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had been able to develop 
about 736,969 hectares of land and resettle 52,728 families. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The major conclusion obtained from the Philippine experience was that 
a land settlement program alone cannot solve social and economic problems. 
The program of settlement was successful in population redistribution and 
growth of agricultural output, but failed in one important objective, the 
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pacification of cultural minorities. Finally, the most important lesson to be 
learned from this analysis, which is indirectly related to land settlement 
schemes: a significant cause of the problems that land settlement programs 
were called to address were the broad macroeconomic and trade policies that 
had tremendous impact on the demographic configuration of the Philippines. 
These same policies also tended to negate the long-term benefits that could be 
expected from the various settlement projects. Unless changes are made in 
these more fundamental policies, the ultimate benefits from land settlements 
will be very small or negligible. 
CHAPTER X 
SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL 
Israel is considered a pioneer state with large and extensive experience in 
land settlement planning and implementation. As mentioned in the 
introduction, land settlements continue to be a high priority in many 
countries to utilize uncultivated and sparsely populated areas as part of rural 
development. The discussion here involves case studies of two settlements 
in Israel which had unique conditions pertaining to type of land use, 
initiative, institutional characteristics of the promoting agency, and 
orientation for good self-management. The study was done by Yair Levi 
(senior researcher at the settlement study center, Rohovot, Israel) and Gedalia 
Naveh (senior research associate at Columbia University in New York, 1983). 
The study was conducted to find settlements that had differed 
significantly from each other in their development, mainly with respect to 
two important aspects: first, the delegating of the authority from an external 
team of change agents to the settlers; and second, economic consolidation. 
The two settlements that met these requirements were also found to share a 
number of features, such as the settlers' country of origin, the arrival time in 
Israel and to the settlement, the type of farm, the allocation of production and 
the kind of assistance provided by the settling agency. These two settlements 
were selected from a total of 31 Moshvei ovdim (small holder cooperative 
settlement) in Israel. 
OTZEM SETTLEMENT 87 
Located close to the northern line of Lakhish region and about halfway 
between Ashkelon and the town of Kiryat Gat, this settlement was one of the 
14 settlements that make up the Lakhish regional council and one of the five 
Moshvei olim (immigrant moshav) served by the Nehora rural center, where 
the offices of the regional council were located. 
OTZEM was the first settlement established under the program of 
regional settlement based on the composite rural structure. Of the settlers at 
OTZEM, all of the 60 settlers' families came to Israel in May 1955 from the 
Atlas mountains of Morocco. They were from the same community and 
ethnically very homogeneous. This initial homogeneity was an important 
factor in understanding the settlement development. The background of the 
settlers was characterized by traits which were at odds with those required for 
optimal socialization to moshove life and the overall absorption into Israel 
society. 
On the arrival of the settlers at the OTZEM settlement, they found small 
houses available for temporary accommodation, as well as small village 
facilities such as an office, a dispensary, a food store and a few classrooms, as 
well as the synagogue and Mikve (a ritual bath used by religious Jews). The 
settlement instructors, who were mostly volunteers from a veteran kibbutz, 
were already at the settlement. In comparison with the new immigrants 
from Morocco, the external change agents displayed different ethnic cultural 
traits; however, this seems to have been compensated for by their devotion 
and commitment. Sharing with the settlers their way of life was an essential 
part of their role and a source of pride for them. 
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Type of Farming on the Settlement 
Field crops were the basis for the farm type established for the OTZEM 
settlement and its surrounding villages was established on field crops. Crops 
included sugar beets, cotton, groundnuts, vegetable crops, and fruit orchards. 
Citrus, peach and apples orchards were established on a collective plot. 
Land Allocation 
Each of the 86 settlers received about 37 dunans* in addition to their 
share in the collective plot of about 3,000 dunans. Vegetables were grown at 
first on the 3 dunans adjacent to the house and then increasingly on the 
larger plots (about 10-20 dunans). 
The Settlers' Income 
The average farm income rose from IL600 in the first year (1955-1956) to 
IL500,100 in 1964-1965. Total average annual net income rose from IL1,600 to 
IL5,100, and administered wages for farm and relief workers diminished from 
IL1,000 to IL100 in 1959-1960 (reported by Yaia Levi & Gedalia Noveh). 
Within nine years of the settlement's inception, the settlers had become 
responsible and hard-working. They came to be considered .the vegetable 
suppliers of the area. They had gradually progressed along the steps set forth 
by the planning, namely, the termination of salaried labor in the 
administered farm; the shift from vegetable cultivation on the plot adjacent 
to the house to a combination of vegetable and other crops; taking over some 
of the local function tasks through the election of a village committee; and 
withdrawal of the external advisory team. Up until 1968, the OTZEM 
settlement was registered as a cooperative, and was the last among the 
* Each dunan equals 250 meters; or 10 dunans equals 1 hectare. 
immigrant moshovim in the Lakhish region to achieving legal 
incorporation. 
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The withdrawal of the extemal advisory team and the regionalization of 
most of its functions prevented prolonged guidance The planners were 
served by having the village play an increasingly important role in the 
development of the area. However, this left OTZEM settlement insufficiently 
able to cope with two important factors: first, the challenge of new 
agricultural technologies, and second,** the exposure to over dependence on 
regional purchasing organizations. 
In 1974 a plan for economic development was drawn up to diversify the 
farm structure of the settlement. The plan failed to generate a better local 
leadership or train people to be capable of coping with the requirements of 
more sophisticated credit and marketing operations. Farm specialization led 
to the formation of new pressure groups and disrupted the old homogeneity 
in the production. In the absence of adequate assistance and follow-up, the 
settlement was ill-prepared when it entered the areas of turkey and flower 
production, and consequently soon became overly dependent on the regional 
purchasing organization. This proved advantageous for a few of the most 
enterprising members and generated distrust in the village committee. 
The settling authority of Israel set Aprill, 1979 as the date for formal 
consolidation of OTZEM settlement. The phase of formal consolidation, a 
crucial one in the strategies of guided farm settlement, implied that an 
assessment be done of investments still to be made, in production factors for 
each holding according to the farm type, and taking into consideration 
investments already made. The date was to serve as a baseline estimating the 
value of the investment. On the signing of the consolidation contract, the 
** 1 US$= ll.. 1-8. 
90 
settlers were considered sufficiently mature to make the best use of the 
investment and capable of refunding the loans on a long-term basis with easy 
rates of interest. 
For the OTZEM settlement, the consolidation process of 1979 should 
have served as a continuation of the 1974 pre-consolidation; however, many 
elements contributed to a wide gap between the plan's intention and its 
implementation. The importance the gap was that it challenged the 
expectations of the average settler. Given inadequate information and 
preparation, he could have no clear idea of the criteria concerning the 
evaluation of his economic situation and the determination of investments. 
The settlers' attitudes were of anticipated well-being and economic strength, 
with little if any regard to the commi~ent expected of him. Such a situation 
was encouraged by the failure of the management committee to exercise 
effective social control. 
Participation in Production 
According to Moshav secretary estimates, only 12-15 settlers out of a total 
of 86 were fully engaged in farming. These were producers of vegetables for 
processing plants and export. Another 25-30 worked in agriculture either 
fully or on a part-time basis, mainly in fruit and vegetable production. More 
than half of the adult male population of the settlement were in 
nonagricultural employment or were unemployed on account of age, illness 
or even refusal to work, as in the case of many of the youth. 
In the summer of 1982, the overall debt of the OTZEM settlement was 
about IL530 million,t and originated in part from losses in floriculture. Of a 
maximum of 15 producers of flowers in 1978-1979, four remained in 1982. 
t 1527- US $1. (Cited by Jewish agency 1981) (?) 
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A number of major externalities at the macro level lay under the overall 
crisis that afflicted the Israeli agricultural sector in the early 1980s. Included 
were diminishing returns on agricultural products due to international 
competition, and the change in Israeli development policies. 
The capability of OTZEM settlement to rehabilitate itself through this or 
other programs depends largely on its ability, under proper guidance, to 
exploit its young labor potential, previously largely underutilized. 
Demography 
The OTZEM settlement was considered the third largest settlement of 
the Lakhish region, population 592. The average family size was 6-9 persons, 
the age group 15-29 made up 44.1 percent of the total male population. Of the 
89 men comprising the 18-24 age group, 50 (56.2o/o) were working outside their 
family farm, and 14 (15.7%) were neither working or studying. 
NOAM SETTLEMENT 
The settlement is located on Beersheba Road and Even Shmuel. Noam 
is part of the Shafir Regional Council and is the regional housing center. It is 
about 3 km south of Kiryat Gat, a rural town of the Lakhish region, which 
offers a variety of commercial facilities. Kiryat Gat houses the regional 
organization, which provides the Noam settlement with accountancy 
services. 
Size of the Settlement 
Noam is smaller than OTZEM in both size and population. Its total area 
is 5,095 dunams, of which 2,859 are under irrigated agriculture and 2,236 are 
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under the local cooperative as a single unit consisting of irrigated citrus trees 
(400 dunams) and rain fed cereal crops (1,848 dunams). The population 
between 1979-1980 was 503 people. Each of the 83 households had an average 
of 34.4 dunans. 
Noam Settlers 
All of the settlers of the settlement came from a common Moroccan 
origin. Despite their commonality, they displayed great heterogeneity in 
ethnic characteristics. There were three groups that came to the settlement. 
The first, 33 families of urban origin, arrived in August 1955. The second, 11 
families from the Ta'anach Moshav settlement area in northern Israel, 
arrived in November 1955. From a small township in the Marakesh area, the 
third group, 12 families, arrived in April 1957. Such a mix led in time to 
repeated conflicts and an intricate web of alliances. 
Because the internal unrest encouraged high turnover of external 
instructors, the department of community works introduced new modes of 
intervention for achieving the desired organizational outcome of the 
settlement. Such heterogeneity of background served as a stimulus to 
intergroup competition on the whole. The planned stage of salaried labor as a 
preparation towards the allocation of plots achieved the objective of the 
planners, in that it gave way to a gradual shift in the settlers from salaried 
worker to farm operator. 
Type of Settlement Production 
In the beginning, cotton, sugar beets and vegetables formed the entire 
production activity in the settlement. From 1968 on, turkey and dairy 
farming were gradually introduced. By 1970 there were 31 dairy farmers and 9 
turkey farmers, from a total of 47 households. The introduction of dairy 
production was done with the purpose of more diversified farm types. 
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The dairy production, however, did not come up to expectations, and by 
the end of 1974, only three of the dairy farms were still in operation. Sugar 
beets declined until their cultivation was discontinued in 1971. The returns 
from cooperative marketing of vegetables from 36 settlers declined by 94 
percent. However, vegetable production for private markets continued, with 
smaller quantities and on less land. At the same time, new employment 
opportunities began to emerge in nearby places. These trends led to the 
liquidation of the dairy herds and shifts to turkey production as the most 
attractive product. 
In 1980 the land settlement department declared Noam settlement ready 
for economic consolidation. The regional purchasing organization, which 
invested large sums of money in the construction of cow barns and turkey 
houses, started exerting pressure to bring about its implementation, as it had 
an interest in regaining its past investment in the financial allocations from 
the land settlement department. 
The move toward economic consolidation met with strong opposition 
from the settlers. Many of the settlers saw non-cooperative marketing as a 
means of avoiding the control exerted by the regional purchasing 
organization on their defaulting accounts. The consolidation process was 
ignored by the settlers. The consequential struggle and the repeated impaired 
management led to an election five years later in 1976. 
In 1981, the Noam settlement moved toward self-management. The 
long experience enabled the settlers to evaluate their past history with a new 
awareness of their potential. They learned that internal discord serves the 
establishment more than their own interests. During the 1981 political 
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elections, the people of Noam settlement took revenge on their party by 
denying it their vote. Even so, they still felt heavily dependent on their party, 
particularly on the economic benefit afforded by the regional purchasing 
organization as well as welfare services. 
FROM ADMINISTERED TO SELF-MANAGED COMMUNffiES: 
THE MODEL IN THE LAKHISH EXPERIENCE 
The methods of settlement in Moshavi Olim and their management 
underwent a number of changes as a result of the experience gained during 
the establishment of settlement activities and supervision over them. At the 
beginning of mass settlement, in the years 1949-1952, no definite model was 
set for managing rural settlements. Ad hoc solutions were improvised by 
those responsible for the establishment and promotion of settlements. Only 
at a later stage, between 1954 and 1956, were organizational and 
administrative tools formulated which determined the administration of 
settlements. Studies and surveys conducted after that time revealed that the 
new methods were more adequate than the earlier ones, and allowed a 
speedier transition from administered communities to self-managed ones. 
These methods evolved mainly during the settlement of the Lachish region 
in the years 1955-1956. In the course of the settlement project, quite a few new 
Moshavin were established and occupied mainly with new immigrants from 
Africa and Asia, who came to Israel shortly before they settled in the Moshav 
and in most cases were brought to the Moshav directly upon arrival in Israel. 
The administration methods applied in the Lakhish region were based 
on a number of stages which are described in the following. These together 
with a few other measures will be discussed later, enabled settlements to 
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reach a certain degree of self-management within a shorter period of time 
than those that were established earlier and were not administered according 
to the new principles. 
Selection of Settlers 
The selection of settlers was minimal, and was based essentially on the 
age of the family in order to avoid settlement of older families who would be 
unable to work on the farm. The selected candidates were mostly young and 
middle-aged heads of families. Factors such as the health of family members, 
level of education, or professional training were not consider during 
selection. The lack of rigid selection led to the amassing of a large number of 
unsuitable settlers who could not adjust to rural life, and who finally had to 
leave the Moshav. The phenomenon of departure was therefore widespread 
in Moshavi Olim. There are no accurate data on the number of families that 
left, but estimates by the settlement department claim that of those referred to 
rural settlements between 1949-1954, about 30 percent either left or were 
expelled, whereas in 1955-1956, the figure dropped to about 16 percent, which 
was attributed to improvement in the selection process. 
The External Supporting Team 
In general, the new settlements were established as Moshavin. Village 
institutions never functioned as they should. No village committee was 
elected, and even when a committee of any village existed, it was ineffective. 
The daily administration and key positions were operated by the settlement 
department. 
The outside people who lived in the village varied from settlement to 
settlement, but on the average, it included three instructors and two or three 
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functionaries. The accepted models included a general instructor, extension 
worker, and home economics instructor 
The job of the general instructor was to manage the village. He 
represented the Moshav in its relations with regional or national agencies, 
such as marketing and purchasing organizations, ministries and so on. He 
was in charge of interpreting the various development plans designed by the 
settlement department and explaining the basic principles of the Moshav to 
the settlers, and organizing elections to local institutions of the Moshov in 
order to gradually lead the settlers toward self-management. The instructor 
would operate primarily by serving as an advisor to the elected functionaries 
in key positions. The ability of the instructor to gain the confidence of settlers 
in general, and of the elected leadership in particular, played an important 
role in determining his success. The general instructor functioned as the 
channel for development between the settlement department and the 
Moshav; he therefore participated, together with his superiors in the 
settlement department, in the preparation of the annual budget. In the end, 
as long as the villagers were unable to manage the responsibility of 
administering their Moshav, the general instructor was the central 
organizing and managing figure in the village. 
The main function of the extension worker, as any agricultural 
extension worker, was dispersing agricultural guidance to every settler in the 
settlement. Usually he was a graduate of agricultural school or an 
experienced farmer from a veteran agricultural settlement. He followed 
recommendations and directives formulated by regional branch experts. He 
was like the general instructor in that he operated in a way to enable settlers 
to gradually assume self-management of their own plots. 
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The job of the home economics instructor included guiding the entire 
family, the housewife in particular, in the organization of the household, 
including budgeting of family expenses, setting up priorities for family 
consumer needs and advising on home maintenance. The home economics 
instructor played an important role for immigrants who located in the new 
settlements. 
All three instructors were employees of the settlement department. In 
addition to the three major instructors, the external supporting team 
generally included two or three other workers. A kindergarten teacher, a 
nurse, and the local grocery manager. The kindergarten teacher was 
appointed and paid by the Ministry of Education, and the nurse was employed 
by Kupat Holim (the national health insurance organization). In some cases, 
the manager of the local grocery store was a private individual. Yet in most 
cases, the manager was a representative of the cooperative society that 
managed such groceries in Moshvi Olim. 
The team's work in the Moshav was supervised by regional officers 
appointed for each of the regional units. The activities of the general 
instructor and home economics instructor were supervised mostly by the 
officers of the settlement, who were formally employees of its settlement 
department. Their role was to advise the instructors and to serve as 
intermediaries between them and the regional office of the settlement 
department. The extension workers on the other hand, were chosen and 
appointed by the department, and were in direct contact with the regional 
branch experts. 
STAGES IN THE TRANSITION FROM ADMINISTERED TO SELF-
MANAGED COMMUNITY 
The settlement department defined a number of stages in the 
development of settlements toward self-management, which have been 
applied ever since the implementation of Lakhish project in 1955. 
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The stages represent a gradual process, both with regard to the 
agricultural training of settlers and in relation to management aspects, 
leading to self-administration of the settlement and proper functioning of the 
village institution and committees. This approach allowed the settlement 
department to spread the allocation of means of production over an extended 
period of time. The stages were not laid down as official regulations or 
procedures and therefore differed in each case. In general, the process was 
divided into three distinguishable stages: a stage of administration by 
external agencies; a stage of transition; and a stage of consolidation and 
weaning. 
Stage of Administration of External Agencies 
This stage usually lasted for three years following the establishment of 
the settlement. During this period, the agricultural branches were managed 
as an administered farm, and the various institutions were run by teams of 
instructors. In the first year the farmer did not receive any land for 
individual farming. In order to start the agricultural enterprise, a public 
company was founded by the settlement department affiliated with the 
Moshav, and all the village lands were handed over to it. The extension 
worker, together with a team of supervisors appointed by the public company, 
organized the work schedule, and the settlers worked as hired laborers and 
received a daily wage. This system allowed settlers to start working in 
agriculture without taking on themselves the risk attendant upon 
inexperience, their own or that of the settlement department, and without 
having to worry about the management of the farm. 
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During the first year only a relatively small part of the land earmarked 
for cultivation was actually tilled. The figures are different from one 
settlement to the other, but on the average about 10-20 percent of all the land 
allocated to a settlement was planted. The second year the settler was 
allocated an individual plot near his house, while the rest of the land was 
cultivated as before. 
The third year, the area cultivated as one lot was much reduced, and the 
plots allocated to individuals for cultivation were extended, in most cases 
administered. Cultivation was terminated by the end of the third year, and 
areas were then allocated to the individual settlers. 
Stage of Transition 
The duration of transition varied in different settlements but usually 
lasted longer than the originally predicted period of 7-8 years set by the 
planners Settlements established in the Lakhish region in 1955 were 
supposed to undergo a transition stage lasting 5-6 years. In fact, this stage 
usually lasted for 10-12 years, but in some cases settlements were still at the 
stage of transition 25 years since their establishment. The reasons for this 
situation were mostly the lack of the necessary funds from the settlement 
department to accomplish the process. 
Stage of Consolidation and Weaning 
The consolidation stage of a settlement was reached when the settlement 
100 
department, the settlement movements, and the settlers themselves all 
agreed that the settlement was ready to become independent of the regular 
care of the department. Once the decision was reached, the settlement 
department and the Moshav sign a consolidation contract. This contract, 
which is later also signed with every member of the Moshav, lists all the 
property, the equipment and means of production provided by the settlement 
department over the years, and states the terms for repayment of the loan. 
Thus upon entering the consolidation stage, each settler is to pay back the 
loan he received according to the defined conditions. The stage of 
consolidation and weaning usually lasted about three years. 
The first group of 110 settlements from 300 Moshavim established 
between 1948-1960 reached the stage of consolidation in 1966. At the 
beginning of 1981, over 200 settlements reached the consolidation stage. 
Some 100 settlements still remained at the second stage 25 years since their 
establishment (Rokach 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
The stages of development and the management methods in the 
Moshavim that were established in Israel during the 1950s constituted a 
typical example of the weaning process in cooperative rural villages found in 
administered communities. Weaning was achieved by joint effort of several 
agencies and organizations, the settlement department of the Jewish agency, 
settlement movements, and regional organizations such as the regional 
purchasing organization and the regional councils. Without the integrated 
activity of all the organizations involved, the weaning process would 
probably have been longer and more difficult. 
CHAPTER XI 
LAND SETTLEMENTS IN INDONESIA 
Land settlements in Indonesia differ from the examples previously 
mentioned in this dissertation. Indonesian land settlements were 
implemented as a means to alleviate the population pressures existing on the 
island of Java. The directed movement of people from the island of Java to 
the outer islands of Indonesia proved to be one of the largest such 
movements in the world. 
The movement of Indonesian people from Java to less populated islands 
dates back to the turn of the 20th century. The policy established to 
commence this movement was known as transmigration. At the turn of the 
century, Java's population accounted for nearly 80% of the Indonesia's total 
population. The tremendous population located in Java and corresponding 
evidence of declining rural social and economic welfare were two major 
contributing factors to the establishment of the transmigration policy. 
IDSTORY OF TRANSMIGRATION POLICY 
The transmigration or settlements established by the government acted 
as nucleated communities and attracted unsponsored migration. The 
ultimate goal in transmigration was to set up a flow of spontaneous migrants 
who would move from overcrowded areas without government assistance. 
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Such migration occurred on a large scale, especially in the provinces closet to 
Java. Spontaneous migration reinforced the official transmigration program, 
achieving its purposes at relatively little cost to the government. 
Spontaneous migration accelerated the growth of settler communities 
and provided additional labor forces for clearing, planting, and other 
agricultural works. A few independent settlers arrived at the new 
communities from Java and Bali. During the 1970s the migration continued 
entirely independent of government support. The introduction of new, 
rapidly maturing varieties of rice, which produced three crops a year, 
produced higher incomes but also labor shortages. The higher incomes and 
labor shortages contributed to attract increasing numbers of not just farmers 
or farm laborers, but school teachers, shopkeepers, craftsmen, and others who 
found their services in demand. As economic growth throughout the nation 
increased during the 1970s there was a reverse flow of people from the outer 
islands to Java. Java was the center of the nation's new found growth in the 
1970s and as such proved to be a substantial attractor of outer island settlers 
who were motivated by the employment opportunities and other benefits of 
city life. 
To encourage the movement of people from Java to the outer islands, 
primarily Sumatra, the Indonesian government provided migrant families 
with free transportation and access to arable land which could be purchased 
using government loans. Government loans were also made available for 
building materials, tools and seeds. In Lampung, the province of Sumatra 
closest to Java, substantial investment in irrigation was made by the 
Indonesian government. 
Between 1905 and 1922, nearly 22,000 people were moved to settlements 
in the southern Sumatra provinces of Lampung and Benghulu. In the 1920's 
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the transmigration stopped, although there was some spontaneous migration 
to the Lampung settlements. In 1932 the colonial government of the 
Netherlands decided to resume transmigration. The needs of established 
settlers for harvest labor were met by bringing migrants to work for one 
season before becoming settlers themselves in new villages. By 1940 some 
200,000 government sponsored migrants had settled in new villages under 
the Netherlands migration policy. During the 1930s a large spontaneous flow 
of migrant labor moved into the Sumatran plantations. In 1942 with the 
Japanese occupation, settlements came to an end. 
For nearly fifteen years following World Warn the Indonesian economy 
was racked by civil war and political instability. The Indonesian population 
continued to grow and manifest in congestion and poverty throughout Java 
and Bali. It was estimated that two-thirds of the nation's population lived 
below the poverty line. By 1966 economic development was given priority. 
The oil boom of the early 1970s provided Indonesia with resources for rapid 
economic growth. 
RENEWED INTEREST IN TRANSMIGRATION 
By the 1970s the change in government had restimulated interest in 
transmigration. Realizing that transmigration could not solve the problem of 
population imbalance, the government came to view it as a policy with a 
welfare objective. The objective was to raise the living standards of migrants 
as well as the standards of villages in Java. It was hoped that transmigration 
could serve as regional economic development on the outer islands. 
During the 1973-7 4 and 1979-80 OPEC oil price increases, foreign 
exchange earnings were introduced to Indonesia. Large revenues went to the 
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government which in turn identified development targets throughout the 
country. The transmigration policy became a main beneficiary. Both the scale 
of the transmigration program and its regional development objectives 
became more ambitious. The income of migrant settlers was raised by giving 
them enough land to grow cash crops as well as food for their own needs. 
Special emphasis was placed on tree crops such as rubber and oil palm. 
Transmigration was accelerated to settlements that would benefit from 
the development of new infrastructure and community facilities such as 
schools, clinics, and water. The land settlements were to serve as growth 
centers by attracting spontaneous migrants from populated areas like Java. 
The land settlements would also serve to promote regional development 
beyond agriculture by diversifying to processing and manufacturing, as well 
as trade and services. 
Major components of the transmigration and settlement policy included 
(1) selection of transmigrants; (2) selection of settlement sites; (3) land 
preparation; (4) migrant assistance; and (5) regional development. 
Selection of Transmigrants 
The selection of migrants involved three principles. Participation 
should be voluntary, only family units should be involved, and priority 
given to people from communities affected by natural disasters such as 
flooding or volcanic eruptions. The family head had to be 20 to 40 years of age 
and married with a family of not more than five members. No member of 
the household could be over 60 or under six months of age. Pregnant women 
were not allowed to participate with a family during migration. Farming 
skills were desirable but not necessary. As the program expanded in the 1970s 
officials started to stress the need to include migrants with skills that included 
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building and construction 
Finally, the migration was voluntary and therefore somewhat self-
selective as the potential migrants were showing a willingness to leave their 
roots and face the risks of building a new life in unknown environments. 
Settlement Site Selection 
Selection of sites for transmigration settlements was based on two 
criteria; suitability for irrigation and proximity to Java. As the areas in south 
Sumatra and Lampung available for rice farming became threatened by 
population increases, attention shifted to other parts of the country for 
availability of good agricultural land. Much of the land in north Sumatra and 
south Sulawesi was already under cultivation. The choices left were between 
the relatively poor soils of the rain-fed upland and reclaimable swamp. 
After 1966, the swamp reclamation alternative became the choice among 
transmigration planner. Nearly 1/4 of the total Indonesian land area 
consisted of swamps. The swamp reclamation alternative appeared 
appropriate in part because food production was a priority objective and 
reclaimed swampland, with its tidal irrigation, was suitable for rice 
cultivation. 
Swamp reclamation was pioneered in Indonesia by spontaneous 
migrants. Swamp reclamation for land settlements were made, under 
government auspices before and after World War II. These reclamation 
measures attracted few settlers. 
With little opportunity for more settlement on irrigated lowlands, and 
swamp reclamation lagging, the transmigration program shifted its sights to 
locations in the rain-fed upland areas of the outer islands. The upland areas 
of the outer islands has some agricultural potential, but the soils were 
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naturally low in fertility and highly susceptible to erosion. The upland areas 
were more suited to tree planting than crop cultivation. 
In 1978, as part of a major reorganization of the transmigration program, 
responsibility for selection and evaluation of large sites was assigned to the 
Directorate of Regional and City Planning, with assistance from the World 
Bank. Soon thereafter, staff resources and appropriate procedures were 
developed. 
Prior to clearing land, the newly reorganized transmigration program 
planned the selection of sites based on regional development criteria such as 
proximity to existing or proposed roads and regional growth centers. Sites 
were screened using existing data including aerial photography, topographic 
mapping, and soil surveys. These materials were analyzed to assess any 
potential blocks to accelerated settlement. 
Land Preparation 
The standard practice during the 1950s and 1960s was to give migrant 
families 2 hectares of land. One hectare was cleared by the government before 
the migrants arrived, while the other hectare was to be cleared by the settlers 
following their arrival. But clearing off the second hectare was not an easy 
job to accomplish. It often proved beyond the migrants' capabilities. 
Furthermore, the land cleared was only rain-fed which yielded a subsistence 
income at best. 
In the 1970s, with the assistance of the World Bank, plots of 3.5 - 5.0 
hectares were allocated to each transmigrant family. The major portion of 
this land, including the 1 hectare cleared by the government, was reserved for 
tree crops. The government also assumed responsibility for provision of 
settlement infrastructure. In some instances the adequate preparation of sites, 
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including soil surveys, clearing of land, construction of roads, and building of 
settler homes and community buildings took up to six years. 
In 1978, the Directorate General of Transmigration was exclusively 
responsible for village planning, land clearing, and construction of houses 
and other village infrastructure. In the same year, village planning and land 
clearing were transferred to the new Directorate for Land Planning in the 
Department of Public Works. The new Directorate sought private contractors 
to clear the land. This action stimulated heated debate between the 
Indonesian government and the World Bank and affiliated consultants. 
Government agencies preferred mechanical clearing as an expedient manner 
to keep up with timetables. The World Bank preferred and advised use of 
manual techniques for clearing, citing soil conservation concerns and the 
prohibitive equipment costs associated with clearing small plots of land. 
Migrant Assistance 
The key factors to keep migrants in their new settlements was to provide 
them with other kinds of assistance besides land and housing. In the 1950s it 
was assumed that initial support to settlers such as seed and food allowances 
for a few months until the first crop was harvested was sufficient for the 
development of a successful settlement. This proved to be unrealistic, either 
because the land was not cleared when the settlers arrived or because the first 
crops were disappointing due to poor soil, inadequate water, or pests. 
In the 1970s, the settlers received assistance during the first 12 month 
following their arrival. Under this plan the settlers had time to clear and 
cultivate their fields. The standard support consisted of monthly rations of 
rice and other household foods. Additionally, they received an initial supply 
of farming tools, fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and seedlings, and in some cases a 
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draught animal. Failure to ensure that these essential supplies and services 
reached the settlers in a timely and proper manner proved to be a chronic 
logistical problem for the program. 
One of the most effective forms of assistance to transmigrants was the 
promotion of tree crop planting. The World Bank provided financial and 
technical assistance in support of tree crop cultivation projects, chiefly rubber 
trees. The primary objective was to raise the income of settlers by growing 
cash crops instead of food crops. 
Regional Development 
The contribution of regional development to the nation of Indonesia 
resulting from the policy of transmigration in the outer islands of Indonesia, 
particularly Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi was substantial. 
Development of the primarily forested areas prompted movement of nearly 3 
million settlers into new village communities and stimulated large scale rice 
cultivation. The program of transmigration contributed to the major policy 
goal of increased food production, as well as establishing the development of 
infrastructure items such as roads, irrigation and swamp reclamation. The 
program was also a contributing factor in the promotion of industry and 
trade, exploitation and processing of mineral, forest, and other resources. It 
also prompted the improvement of transportation and communications 
necessary to integrate the country more effectively into the national and 
world economy. 
The outcomes of the program were less beneficial for the outer islands 
themselves. Members of settler families and spontaneous migrants initially 
attracted to the transmigrant settlements occasionally eased local labor supply 
problems for timber companies, and for small landholders and estate 
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producers of cash crops. The roads built in association with transmigration 
improved market access for timber, cash crops, and processing industries. 
However, the major economic infusions to the outer islands weren't a result 
of the transmigration program. Instead, major industrial and economic 
developments in the outer islands through the 1970s came chiefly from oil 
and natural exploration and production. 
CONCLUSION 
Two serious constraints emerged in the transmigration program. The 
first being financial, the second, land availability. Most of the available land 
on the outer islands was unusable. It was either mountainous or swampland. 
What was available was often of poor soil quality or steep and subject to 
erosion and leaching. Aside from these basic land limitations, there were 
three factors which limited the land available for transmigration settlements. 
First, emerging national and international recognition of land conservation 
and rational exploitation of forest resources. Second, the native grasses which 
grew in the uplands were traditional obstacles to conventional agricultural 
production. Third, prior assertions to land claims by indigenous peoples of 
the region. 
The financial constraints and the costly efforts to improve conditions for 
transmigrant via the provision of transportation, clearing and planting of 
settlement sites, housing, food rations, irrigation, road construction, health, 
education and welfare facilities, and expensive consultant services all 
conspired to increase the cost to the government per transmigrant family. 
Even with costs rising, the number of transmigrant families continued to 
increase. 
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Until the 1980s the transmigration program and other national 
economic and social development projects were supportable with Indonesia's 
oil revenue. The government began to recognize the competition between 
the transmigration program and other programs for limited resources. Some 
of the program costs were met by outside agencies such as the World Bank, 
the International Development Agency, and the United Nation's World Food 
Program. Indonesia has continued to struggle with funding the 
transmigration program as economic resources become constrained. 
With all the commitment to the transmigration program showed by the 
Indonesian government over the years it would be unbelievable to 
recommend abandonment. The program has demonstrated the courage of 
policy makers and administrators to implement a scheme that is very capable 
of moving very large numbers of transmigrant families from Java to the 
outer islands. The program has also demonstrated support from the World 
Bank which provided technical assistance to address immense logistic and 
organizational problems. 
There are problems, but with assistance, the program can address 
deficiencies in administration. Assistance can help bring new technologies to 
improve cropping patterns and animal husbandry. Developing new methods 
of planting and cultivating trees such as rubber, oil palm, and coconut may 
help to offset the low yields associated with the poor soils. Finally, 
technological assistance to eradicate indigenous grasses and make swamp 
reclamation less expensive could help to achieve one of the program's goals 
of generating more food. 
CHAPTERXIT 
COMPARISON OF SETTLEMENT PROJECTS 
The discussion in this chapter will examine the policies and 
implementation of different resettlement projects and make an effort to 
understand the problems facing settlement programs in different countries, to 
understand the problems of what should or could have been done to 
improve the settlements and their settlers' well-being. There are some 
selective points of importance to be discussed, such as the performance of 
settlements concerning their objective achievements. Other important points 
include the the economic and social problems faced by settlements that 
affected their success or failure. Additionally, examine resettlement policies 
and their implications to determine if they were appropriate to solve the 
problems of poverty, unemployment and population redistribution. 
ACHIEVEMENT OF SETTLEMENT OBJECTIVE 
Population Redistribution 
In Indonesia, such an idea was not new. The colonial Dutch tried it in 
1905, but for economic reasons rather than to relieve population pressures. 
During independence, however, the process increased greatly between 1950 
and 1977. A great number of the settlers moved independently throughout 
most of the period. The program was much more successful in meeting its 
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targets following 1977. The target for the five-year plan (1979-84) was to move 
about 2 million people. It was not an easy task, but the government appeared 
to have achieved it. Encouraged by this success, the government wanted to 
move twice as many people in five years following 1984. However, relieving 
population pressure by moving people from Java to South Sumatra had only 
minimal impact because the population of Java increased by 35 million 
during the same period. 
In Malaysia, while population redistribution was never an objective of 
land development programs, most settlers in Malaysia were from their own 
states because most states had a quota requiring a minimum of 50 percent of 
the settlers be from their own state. In this way projects succeed in retaining 
migrants from rural villages within the rural areas. Rural-rural migration is 
therefore encouraged, and thus minimizes rural-urban movement. This may 
shed some light on Malaysia's relatively slow rate of urbanization, compared 
with other developing countries. 
Settlements and Development of New Areas 
There are many reasons why a government develops an 
underdeveloped area: to increase agricultural production; provide land for 
landless or displaced people; relieve population pressures in overcrowded 
areas; or to make use of new areas for industrial or manufacturing 
development. Settlements are not then so much an end in themselves as a 
means of achieving other goals. 
The pilot land settlement project in Iraq was intended to solve the land 
tenure problems in the southern reaches of the country. The outcomes were 
expected to improve the peasants' lives by increasing agricultural production 
and freeing them from landlord domination or control. Dujaila was very 
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successful during its first years of existence. Agricultural yields were 
promising and household incomes increased. Yet after the sixth year, the 
lands under cultivation in the Dujaila project developed a salinity problem 
that was beyond reclamation. Lack of a drainage system contributed to the 
demise of agricultural productivity in the Dujaila project, and ultimately to 
the failure of the intended goals of the land settlement scheme. 
In the Philippines, the earliest settlement projects made use of the 
frontier area to achieve their objectives. The unexplored areas of Mindanao 
and the Cagayan Valley held potential resources that could be exploited. 
Furthermore, a belief permeated the philosophy of settlement development 
that an influx of Christian settlers into these regions would lead to the 
assimilation of cultural minorities. This was an important goal in the early 
settlement of the Mindanao regions. 
The cultivation of unutilized land was also a major issue in parts of 
Africa. In Somalia, about two-thirds of the population was made up of 
nomadic tribes. Only 1.5 million of the 8 million hectares of land available 
for cultivation was actually cultivated. Three agricultural and three fisheries 
settlements were established to settle war refugees and the drought stricken 
population, but the achievement of these settlements were much below 
target. The original target laid down by the settlement development agency 
for developing agricultural land during the five-year plan of 1974- 1978 was 
56,000 hectares. This target was scaled down to 30,000 hectares. During the 
next development plan of 1979- 1981, the settlement development agency's 
objective was to develop 22,000 hectares. However, since 10,000 hectares of 
this was to be in the Dujuma area, the overall target was reduced to 12,000 
hectares when the Dujuma project was abandoned at the end of 1980, because 
the land was found to be unsuitable for irrigated agriculture, and only small 
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portions were suitable for rain-fed agriculture. Soon after, even this modest 
goal was further scaled down to 3050 hectares. The analysis of Somalia 
suggests that fisheries settlements were doing little better than the 
agricultural settlements, although neither appear to have been sufficiently 
successful in economic terms to be worth duplicating in future resettlement 
programs. 
The settlement program in Ethiopia started after the 1974 drought. The 
goal was to settle about half a million people over a period of 10 years. By the 
end of 1983, only 103,500 persons had been settled in 83 settlements. 
Land for the Landless 
In Malaysia, the principal objecti:ve was to develop land for the landless 
and unemployed. In 1966 the government established an additional 
organization aside from the Federal Land Development Agency, called the 
Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority in order to assist 
other poor rural groups such as those with small and fragmented holdings. 
By the end of 1982, the Federal Land Development Agency had developed 331 
projects with a total of 559,906 hectares of agricultural land, involving about 
76,786 families. 
Regional Development 
Land settlement programs have sometimes been seen at least partly as a 
means of promoting regional development, Regional development includes 
the promotion of industry and trade, the exploration and processing of 
minerals, forestry and other natural resources, and improvement of 
transportation and communication necessary to integrate the region more 
effectively into the national economy. Such programs in land development 
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for settlements seem too unrealistic. Land settlements are useful for the 
people who are given the opportunity to grow crops in somewhat better 
conditions than where they were before. Settlements may provide social 
relief for poor people but cannot contribute significantly to the industrial and 
commercial development of the region. 
Agricultural Development 
Agricultural development is considered one of the most important 
among the objectives of settlement programs. In Indonesia, the rate of 
productivity in the northern Sumatran area was been higher than that in 
southern Sumatra. In general, that productivity was low, except in the 
settlements that had tree crops or irrigated rice fields. None of the other 
settlements had returns anything like what the World Bank regards as the 
minimum feasible if the program is to be economically justifiable. 
Settlement programs have not always been so unsuccessful in achieving 
their agricultural objectives. However, as I already reported before, the 
frontier migration in the Philippines was a major factor in increasing 
national agricultural output. 
In Malaysia, land settlement projects made significant contributions to 
the development and diversification of agriculture, although land settlement 
in Malaysia created a small community of modern and relatively prosperous 
rubber and oil palm landholders. Established rubber and oil palm 
landholders appeared to play a significant role in making Malaysia the biggest 
producer of palm oil in the world. 
The OTZEM settlement in Israel, with its vegetable and fruit production 
and processing plants for export, managed to keep about half the settlers 
engaged in agricultural production. 
116 
Improved Welfare of the Settlers 
The settlement projects in general in the developing countries had noble 
objectives: reducing poverty and raising the standard of living for those with 
inadequate holdings of land, the landless, refugees, drought victims, and war 
victims. It is thought that the settlements provided the settlers with better 
incomes and that the concentration of people into settlements made it easier 
to provide social services, such as housing, health care and education. 
Settler Incomes 
In Malaysia, it seems that rural farmers of any age who decided to join 
the Federal Land Development Authority settlements enjoyed, after a few 
years, steady increases in the level of their incomes compared with farmers of 
the same age who did not join the settlement schemes. 
In Indonesia, the settlers seemed to experience some improvements in 
their incomes, although the evidence suggests that the benefits were on 
average relatively small. 
Social Services 
In Tanzania, providing social services, such as clean water, education, 
and health services, to large numbers of the rural population was among the 
most notable achievements of the villagization schemes. Such services led to 
a reduction in mortality, a reduction in the incidence of some diseases, and 
implementation of technical and scientific innovation for social and 
economic development. Since independence, the enrollment rate in primary 
schools has almost tripled. One important social consequence of villagization 
has been the improved position of women in society. Women are entitled to 
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village membership and play an active role in communal agriculture. The 
provision of clean water in many villages has relieved women from the hard 
task of carrying water from far distances to the villages. 
In Somalia, income and production objectives were not met. But the 
settlements were quite successful in creating a social infrastructure that 
contributed to improved hygiene, nutrition, and education opportunities for 
large numbers of families. 
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS 
Abandonment of Settlement Projects 
When settlers were disappointed in their often unrealistically high 
expectations, with poor settlement performance and achievement of 
objectives, the tendency was for settlers to abandon the settlement and seek 
other opportunities elsewhere. 
In Ethiopia, there was a high rate of settler abandonment, the reason 
being settlers were not allowed to bring in their families. This caused a 
shortage of labor and low productivity. 
In Somalia, the productivity in settlements was so low the income of the 
settlers was below the target level and was not adequate. As a result, many of 
the settlers, especially the adult males, abandoned the settlements in search of 
work elsewhere, leaving behind the children and the older members of the 
families so that they could take advantage of the free education and the 
health and housing facilities available in the settlements. 
In Indonesia, lack of facilities, such as housing, clean water, roads for 
marketing and scarcity of nonagricultural employment were among the 
important factors that led settlers to abandon the settlement projects. 
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Lack of Nonagricultural Employment and Second Generation Problems 
Non-farm employment is an area where most settlement projects seem 
to have failed totally. In Malaysia, where the land settlement programs were 
an integrated component of regional development, the problems were not 
solved. The size of the settlement plot was perhaps enough to provide a 
minimum existence for the family, if only family labor was utilized and the 
needs of the family small. However, as the family grows, the shortcomings of 
the small plot and it production potential become apparent. Malaysia had 
rigid principles that settler's land could not be subdivided, for small holdings 
were uneconomic. This meant the settler's dependents had to leave the land 
settlement to seek employment elsewhere. 
In Israel, in the OTZEM settlement, half of its population were employed 
outside the settlement. Under such circumstances, what was needed was the 
establishment of urban-based industries and some kinds of activities in the 
settlement projects or nearby. This had not been achieved. Thus, although 
land settlement programs gave potential rural-urban migrants the alternative 
of remaining in the rural areas, they could play only a temporary role in 
combating rural-urban migration. 
Social Tensions Between Settlers and Original Populations 
Tensions could arise between two groups of people if the settlers are 
perceived to have more or bigger landholdings and better social services or to 
be encroaching on land traditionally farmed by the local community. 
Ecological problems 
Most such problems are seen in many Latin American countries*. The 
* Latin American countries are not included in this study. 
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practice of shifting cultivation by settlers have resulted in the excessive 
deforestation and serious ecological and climatic deterioration that occurred 
in the different basins of the forest highlands. In Peru, for example, during 
the period 1925-1984, approximately 7 million hectares of forest were 
destroyed. The cultivation of crops unsuitable to cleared forest also 
contributed to environmental problems. (Hyman 1984 ). 
CHAPTERXIll 
SETILEMENT SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the performance of national 
resettlement projects in many Third World countries. The major focus of the 
discussion will be on the similarities and differences in the policies and 
implementation of different resettlement projects, to identify the problems 
facing settlement programs, and to understand what should or could be done 
to improve settlement outcome. 
Lack of detailed and comprehensive planning was one of the most 
important factors contributing to poor performance of settlement programs. 
In the case of the Dujaila project in Iraq, there was no serious attention paid to 
preparing a master plan for the area or region. The project failed within six 
years. Settlements in Ethiopia and Somalia also suffered from a lack of 
planning. Because they were conceived during a period of national 
emergency, settlements usually tended to be created long before any social or 
economic planning was carried out. 
In Ethiopia and Somalia things were done quickly, and ambitious and 
unrealistic goals were set to be achieved in far too short a time. The 
resettlement at Dujama in Somalia had to be abandoned five years after it was 
established because of the salinity of the soil. The same thing happened in 
the Dujaila project in Iraq, which had to be abandoned six years after it was 
started. 
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The most important of factor of planning settlements was the suitability 
of the site. As mentioned above, the Dujuma project in Somalia and the 
Dujaila project in Iraq had to be abandoned after five and six years 
respectively because the salinity of the soil made them unsuitable for 
cultivation. Poor choice of sites was also a problem in Ethiopia. 
There are many things as far as the selection of site that must be kept in 
mind. First, the physical condition must be appropriate; second, the soil 
should be in top condition and fertile; third, the rainfall must be adequate or 
there must be easy access to irrigation; fourth, the drainage system must be 
adequate. The settlement must be accessible to essential services as well as 
markets for the settlers' produce at production time. Settlement projects in 
many Third World countries have failed where these considerations have 
not been properly understood. In some cases, settlement sites were selected 
without prior studies of the quality of land or other considerations, such as 
rainfall and irrigation. Some settlements were in remote locations, near 
borders or in disturbed areas which faced serious security problems. 
The size of the plot of the holding was a very important factor in 
attracting settlers. There were two main principles used in determining the 
settlers' plots: (1) the plot must be large enough to provide settlers with a 
better living than what they had in their area of origin, and; (2) the plot must 
not be larger than the settler can cultivate. Land or farm size must vary, 
however, with the type of crop, market conditions, soil management and 
technology available. 
It is not a good policy to place settlers on a holding that does not provide 
them with the ability to change the number of dependents or produce enough 
food crop for their survival. A very small holding will not provide the 
necessary income; conversely, holdings that are too large will favor 
employment of non-family labor and most probably will result in the 
exploitation of permanent non-family labor. 
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Selection of settlers involves issues that are very complex and very 
important. The selection criteria depend on the national objectives. As some 
differ from one country to another, it is very difficult to provide a general 
standard of selection. One important thing that should be done is a clear 
explanation should be given to applicants at the time of selection of what will 
be expected of them and what they can expect in return, so that people do not 
come in with a misunderstanding of what the settlement project is all about. 
An opportunity to be part of a settlement project often raises people's 
expectations even in successful settlements. This may contribute to 
settlement failure. Settlements in general require a major commitment from 
the settlers, but few families are prepared to wait 10 or more years for results 
that they feel should come immediately. 
In some countries, the selection criteria was biased in favor of young 
people. Such conditions meant that villages in rural areas were losing 
energetic and young labor. Such migration effects of land development 
projects on the areas losing labor have yet to be studied. 
The selection priority given to agriculturists with experience obviously 
had merit, though the principle need not be rigidly applied in all types of 
settlements. For example, where the chief objective of a resettlement is to 
resettle refugees or for national security, insistence on agricultural experience 
would be misplaced. 
Some selection procedures were open to abuse. In Indonesia, little 
emphasis on agricultural experience has tended to serve as an excuse for 
including in transmigrant groups all kinds of unskilled and unwanted 
people. 
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There were some merits in resettling people who speak the same 
language, belong to the same tribe, or come from the same background. It 
seems such an approach contributed to the minimization of social conflicts. 
The selection preference for settlers with capital should also be assessed 
within the context of the overall objectives of resettlement. If, as in the 
majority of cases, land settlement schemes are designed specifically for the 
most disadvantaged of the population, then giving priority to those with 
capital conflicts with the overall intention. As far as the success or failure of 
individual settlers is concerned, of course, those with capital have a greater 
chance of success than those without. However, capital wealth is not the only 
prerequisite for a settler's success. 
Land tenure defines the rights and obligations with respect to 
landholding and use of such land in agricultural settlements. The ideal land 
tenure system is one that provides adequate incentives to produce and to 
invest. It should afford reasonable income and security to those who farm 
the land. A good tenure system can also exist for generating adequate 
employment and promoting a more equal distribution of income. 
In general, the approaches with which planners in different third world 
countries can create alternative tenure systems is greatly constrained by 
sociopolitical factors. Within these constraints, however, several general 
considerations apply. Equity and security are essential under any tenure 
system. Subdivision into uneconomic units should be strongly discouraged. 
Settlers must be aware of their rights and obligations, and the settlement 
authority must have the necessary enforcement authority. Settlers' rights 
over the land should carry a direct relationship to their contributions to land 
development. However, governments must impose some restrictions on the 
conditions of land titles; without such conditions, the settlers would either 
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sell the land and thus become landless or subdivide the holding among their 
children and make the land uneconomic for production. 
Good management is important in indicating a settlement's degree of 
success. Management is an integral part of the land development process, 
and implementation of it needs all the help and assistance of all government 
departments, especially the settlement agency. 
To be successful, resettlement operations require a gradual transfer of 
responsibility from settlement agencies to the settlers. Otherwise, a 
relationship of dependency may occur, and all agency resources may become 
tied up in limited numbers of permanently supervised projects. 
In many land settlement projects in Asia and Africa, dependency 
discourages self-mobilization and undermines the settlers' commitment to 
self-reliance and development and increases the costs of settlement. Care 
must be taken to avoid putting the thought in the minds of the settlers that 
they have become permanent wards of the state. This is an example of what 
happened in Somalia. There were fewer work incentives, and family 
incomes were not given adequate consideration. The settlement agencies 
have provided the settlers with all their basic needs. Similar problems have 
occurred in Ethiopia. 
PLANNED AND SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENTS 
As noted earlier, planned settlements required a large degree of 
government involvement, including selection of settlers and types of 
services, and financial aid. In planned settlements, the questions is how 
much responsibility should be left to the individual settlers and how much 
should be guided by the settlement authority. The answer is very hard to 
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determine. The ideal, of course, is to have both combined together, but it 
largely depends on the type of project and the types of crops to be produced. 
On the other hand, if the crops are grown for sale, and if the settlers' farms are 
to be economically viable, some central authority must organize all matters 
that are best done on a large scale, such as irrigation, mechanics operations, 
technical advice, processing and marketing of the crops, and purchase of 
supplies. 
A study done by the World Bank in 1978 suggested that about two-thirds 
of the rate of rural land settlement was due to spontaneous settlement. 
Although spontaneous migration without government assistance is 
widespread, it does present problems of its own. Spontaneous settlements 
take a long time to become available, and unsupervised farming has a 
tendency to disregard proper land management and produces erosion and 
other environmental problems. However, in spite of the bad reputation of 
spontaneous settlement because of natural resource destruction, it does offer 
the best chance of success in developing new land where capital and 
administrative resources are scarce. 
CHAPTER XIV 
CONCLUSION 
Similar to the research done by Oberai (1988) and Levi (1988), my 
research into land settlement programs in some Third World countries has 
led me to believe the programs made no more than a modest contribution to 
the problems of population distribution, unemployment, and poverty. Very 
few settlements reached their objectives. Some increase in agricultural 
production and an improvement in settlers' standards of living was apparent 
in some countries. The overall impact on employment and production was 
limited. 
Even with such limited success, land settlement programs are popular in 
many Third World countries because they are politically more desirable and 
easier to establish than other rural reform programs. While the cost per 
settler of successful settlements was high, even with government assistance, 
the total number of settlers involved in settlement projects has been small in 
comparison with the total number of any given nation's people in need of 
assistance. 
To be successful, the planning and implementation of settlement 
projects requires a close look at the essential needs of the settlers. A very high 
priority should be given to providing community infrastructure and social 
services such as housing, schools, health care, and water supplies. 
Government help for housing should be limited to helping with site 
selection and planning, provision of building materials on credit, and 
technical assistance. This should help make settlers self-reliant and reduce 
the risk of creating dependent farmers. 
127 
When low productivity in settlements result in low incomes for the 
settlers, it is very important that the problems should be overcome by 
introduction of incentives. The provision of training and favorable prices for 
the settlers' goods, produce, and services would contribute to improved 
productivity. In some countries, as in Latin America, the practice of shifting 
cultivation by settlers and the resultant excessive deforestation are major 
factors contributing to the serious ecological deterioration that is being 
experienced in those countries. There is, thus, an urgent need to improve 
agricultural technology and to provide educational programs for the settlers 
covering various aspects of environmental protection. 
Government plans to settle nomadic tribes must understand nomadic 
lives as a cultural system that has evolved over several centuries. From their 
movement, they derive not only subsistence, but the values and satisfaction 
of their particular way of life. The idea of settling them in agricultural areas 
at huge cost, therefore, needs to be reconsidered. In Somalia, for example, 
about one-third of nomad settlers have abandoned settlement projects. 
Help for the nomads must first take the form of helping them to make 
better use of the resources they have, rather than attempting to settle them. 
This could be done by creating growth centers of attraction where they are 
provided with water, food, livestock feed, training, health and veterinary 
services, and other social services. This would reduce the radius of their 
movement, and as these centers of attraction grow in size, they would 
probably develop into settlements. Such a strategy is likely to be more 
successful and cost effective than a settlement program. Alternatively, a 
policy of encouraging voluntary, spontaneous settlement of nomads in 
regions where agricultural potential is greatest may be a more efficient 
alternative to planned settlement projects. 
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It is not sufficient, however, to look at settlements simply in terms of 
their agricultural potential. Purely agricultural settlements are inadequate for 
present day needs. Most settlement planners and implementers fail to give 
consideration in project design to generating non-farm employment, 
especially for settlers' children as they get older and enter into the labor force. 
Land settlements should be planned within an integrated regional 
framework that includes development of related agro-industrial and service 
sectors. One country that has attempted to provide non-agricultural 
employment is the United Republic of Tanzania. Overall, settlement 
schemes suggest that resettlement should not simply move people physically 
from one region to another, but should embrace more concerted and 
imaginative planning and implementation strategies in the areas designated 
for settlement. Settlers must be provided with basic infrastructural facilities, 
and some improvement in income if they are to remain within a project. 
There is a need to review the implementation strategies for new 
settlements based on the costs and benefits of alternative means of increasing 
agricultural production and achieving equitable distribution of land and 
incomes. Possibilities include intensification of cultivation and 
comprehensive land reforms. Even so, land settlement, spontaneous or 
directed, may well continue for reasons such as population distribution, 
accommodation of war refugees, and drought. 
Land settlement should not be considered either as an end in itself or as 
a means of redistributing the population. It should be conceived as a strategy 
for creating viable communities. To be successful, the planning and 
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implementation of settlements requires meeting the essential needs of the 
settlers and providing community infrastructure and social services, such as 
housing, schools, health care and water supplies. 
Overall, settlement projects suggest that resettlement should not be 
simply physically moving people from one area to another, but rather should 
be more concerted in their planning The areas of destination should be more 
fully examined, accounting for basic human needs. Settlers must be provided 
with infrastructure facilities, roads, transportation, and improvement in 
income if they are to remain within the project. 
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